Superannuation and skirting the shoals of bankruptcy **

The Federal Court's decision in Cunningham (Trustee) v Gapes (Bankrupt) [2017] FCA 787 (Federal Court, Collier J, 13 July 2017) (Cunningham) is vital guidance for all advisers in relation to the interplay between superannuation death benefits and the Bankruptcy Act 1966.

In particular, the case highlights the fact that a superannuation death benefit paid via a deceased estate to a bankrupt beneficiary is divisible amongst the creditors of the bankrupt.

At a minimum therefore, advisers should consider advising clients who have at risk potential beneficiaries to utilise a binding death benefit nomination (BDBN). The BDBN should mandate that any death benefit is paid directly from the superannuation fund to a beneficiary at risk of bankruptcy, ideally as a lump sum (given that a pension stream will be subject to the threshold income limits).

Testamentary trusts

One additional strategy that should be considered in the context of deceased estates generally, and specifically in relation to superannuation death benefits, is the use of comprehensive testamentary trusts.

As readers will be aware, 1 of the key reasons that testamentary trusts are often recommended is due to the asset protection offered by the structure generally, and in particular where a potential beneficiary is at risk of suffering an event of bankruptcy.

This approach can help protect beneficiaries, regardless of whether a BDBN is in place, or where a BDBN is implemented and mandates payment of the death benefits to the legal personal representative for distribution under the will.

Importantly, testamentary trusts also provide significant flexibility from a tax planning perspective, as compared to the benefits being paid directly to the bankrupt beneficiary. Previous posts have explored a number of the tax planning issues in relation to testamentary trusts (see for example our posts on 13 May 2014 and 27 October 2015).

Unfortunately, we have seen a number of examples recently where no testamentary trust has been incorporated under a will, with superannuation death benefits passing directly to the estate and then in turn to a bankrupt beneficiary. In other words, creating the exact same factual matrix as existed in Cunningham.

Key issues to remember

In summary, the key issues to be aware of in this type of situation are as follows:

1. Where a beneficiary is bankrupt at the time of the death of the willmaker, the bankruptcy legislation mandates that the bankrupt's entitlements are to pass to their trustee in bankruptcy.
2. If there are any assets remaining after the bankruptcy has been discharged, then the beneficiary is entitled to those assets.
3. The right to due and proper administration of the deceased estate is an asset that forms part of the bankrupt's estate, and therefore also vests in the trustee in bankruptcy.
4. If an executor of an estate seeks to avoid assets passing to a trustee in bankruptcy where a beneficiary is entitled personally under the will, the executor will themselves be personally liable.

Importantly, each of the above issues can be legitimately avoided by the appropriate structuring of a testamentary trust into a will, prior to death.

Where testamentary trusts are not included under a will, best practice dictates that the executor should obtain a formal declaration from each beneficiary, before making distributions to them under the will, whereby each beneficiary confirms that they are in fact solvent.

If a beneficiary refuses to provide the declaration, then further searches should be made by the executor to minimise the prospect that the executor might become personally liable to a trustee in bankruptcy.

As usual, if you would like copies of any of the cases mentioned in this post please contact me.

The above post is based on the article we had published originally in the Weekly Tax Bulletin.

** For trainspotters, ‘skirting the shoals of bankruptcy’ is a line from a song named ‘Accountancy Shanty’ by Monty Python from their 1983 movie ‘The Meaning of Life’.

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How soon is now ** (or ‘as soon as practicable’)?

Last week’s post considered the phrase ‘as soon as practicable’ in light of the 2017 superannuation changes.

Regulation 6.21 of the Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Regulations 1994 (Cth) requires death benefits to be cashed ‘as soon as practicable’ following the death of a member.

Unfortunately, ‘as soon as practicable’ is not defined in the Regulations and has not been otherwise defined.

Generally in our experience the Tax Office has historically expected death benefits to be paid within 6 months of a person's death, or earlier if possible.

While perhaps not directly relevant, part of the reason for this approach is likely to be because under section 17A(4) of the Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Act 1993 (Cth), any replacement trustee (or replacement director of a corporate trustee) must resign within 6 months of the death benefits commencing to be paid. In other words, 6 months is legislated in a manner that is arguably analogous to the concept of ‘as soon as practicable’.

This said, if there are objectively reasonable circumstances preventing payment for more than 6 months, this is unlikely to cause a breach of the rules, so long as the payment occurs as soon as practicable once the relevant circumstances have been resolved.

Some examples of where a payment after 6 months may still meet the ‘as soon as practicable’ test include -

1. It may be that probate of a member's estate is seen as required before paying a death benefit, and generally probate will take longer than 6 months;
2. If there is a risk that an estate may be challenged or the potential recipients of a death benefit challenging the trustee's decision, confirming that the risk has passed will generally take longer than 6 months;
3. Similarly, if there is an actual challenge to a deceased estate this may warrant delaying paying of a death benefit;
4. If there is uncertainty about the validity of any purported binding death benefit nomination this may take longer than 6 months to resolve;
5. The nature of the assets in a fund may make distributions within 6 months impossible, for example illiquid assets such as real estate or investments in platforms that have large penalties for early withdrawal;
6. It may also be that the values of assets that are will form part of the cashing take an extended period to value;
7. Surrounding circumstances, such as poor health of a surviving fund member may also justify a payment commencing later than 6 months.

Interestingly, the 2017 superannuation reform legislation permits a reversionary beneficiary 12 months to decide if they wish to cash their benefit before it is automatically credited to their transfer balance. This allowance may (again by analogy) support the argument that a death benefits payment within 12 months will meet the ‘as soon as practicable’ test, even without other explanatory reasons.

As usual, please make contact if you would like access to any of the content mentioned in this post.

** for the trainspotters – check out iconic 1980s new wave band The Smiths perform ‘How soon is now?’.

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To cut a long story short** In conclusion - 1 related issue

Subject to the terms of the relevant trust deed, a change to the appointor or principal provisions should have no adverse revenue consequences. Any change should, even if not expressly required by the deed, be done with the consent of the incumbent appointor. This is because of the significant ultimate powers retained by the appointor.

This conclusion about the extent of an appointor's powers however does not mean that where an appointor or principal is declared bankrupt, their power of appointment is considered 'property' which vests in and can be exercised by the trustee in bankruptcy.

Historically, there has been some confusion around this issue, given that the property of a bankrupt under the Bankruptcy Act which is available for distribution to creditors includes "the capacity to exercise, and to take proceedings for exercising, all such powers in, over or in respect of property as might have been exercised by the bankrupt for his own benefit…".

However, it has been held that the right of a bankrupt to exercise a power of appointment under a discretionary trust is not property of the bankrupt (see Re Burton; ex parte Wily v Burton (1994) 126 ALR 557).

In that case, the argument of the trustee in bankruptcy centred on the fact that Mr Burton was the appointor and a discretionary beneficiary of a family trust. He could in theory therefore appoint himself (or an entity that he controlled) as trustee.

In rejecting the argument, it was held that the powers of an appointor are fiduciary powers that must be exercised accordingly, in the interest of the beneficiaries.

In other words, the powers of an appointor must be exercised solely in furtherance of the purpose for which they were conferred.

This means that the powers of an appointor do not amount to 'property' that passes to a trustee in bankruptcy.

The powers are also not something that can be exercised by the bankrupt for their own benefit.

By analogy, the power to remove an appointor is also considered to be a fiduciary power (see Ash v Ash [2016] VSC 577).

This means that equitable relief may be imposed upon a third party who knowingly receives some benefit from the fiduciary's wrongful conduct or is knowingly involved in that wrongful conduct (see Barnes v Addy (1874) LR 9 Ch App 244).

An attorney may be able to exercise the powers of an appointor, if this is anticipated by the trust deed or attorney document (and indeed, ideally, both documents in a complementary and considered manner).

An attorney may also be able to exercise an appointor's powers where there is informed consent. Such consent must however involve more than inference from an alleged plan of the principal, particularly where that plan is vaguely defined and based on inference itself. That is, there must be clear evidence of the salient details of the transactions affecting the principal's interests being provided to them before their incapacity (again see Ash v Ash [2016] VSC 577).

Like last week, the above post is again based on an article that we originally contributed to the Weekly Tax Bulletin.

As usual, please make contact if you would like access to any of the content mentioned in this post.

** For the trainspotters, the title of today's post is riffed from the Spandau Ballet song ‘Cut a long story short’.

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Changing an appointor - just like (starting over**) - or changing a trustee; simple! (in theory ...)

A previous post explored the key revenue issues in relation to changing the trustee of a discretionary trust.

An equally important and related issue concerns a decision to change the principal or appointor role of a family trust. That is, the person, people, or company having the unilateral right to remove and appoint a trustee.

As regular readers of this blog will know, there does not necessarily need to be an appointor or principal provision under a trust deed. However, where there is one, a trust deed itself will normally set out in some detail the way in which the role of appointor is dealt with on the death or incapacity of the person (or people) originally appointed.

Where there are no provisions in relation to the succession of the appointor role, it is often necessary to try and rely on any power of variation under the deed to achieve an equivalent outcome.

Generally, from a trust law perspective, it is possible for the appointor provisions to be amended. However, any intended change must be permitted by the trust instrument, meaning the starting point must always be to 'read the deed' – a mantra regularly profiled in this blog. The decision in Mercanti v Mercanti [2016] WASCA 206 (this Court of Appeal judgment stands following the High Court's refusal to reject an appeal) being a leading example of the principle in the context of purported changes to appointorship.

The tax and stamp duty consequences of changing an appointor can be similarly complex.

Stamp duty costs on changing an appointor

In broad terms, the stamp duty consequences of changing an appointor provision can normally be managed in most Australian states.

This said, care always needs to be taken, particularly where the trust deed simply defines the appointor by reference to some other named beneficiary in the trust.

For example, it can often be the case that the appointor is defined as being the primary beneficiary of the trust and that primary beneficiary may also be a default beneficiary.

In these circumstances, depending on how the deed is crafted, there may be stamp duty consequences of implementing any change.

Tax Office views on changing an appointor

In relation to the tax consequences of changing an appointor, there are a number of private rulings published by the Tax Office which support the ability to change an appointor role, particularly if it is part of a standard family succession plan.

Arguably the 2 leading private rulings concerning the tax consequences of changing an appointor are Authorisation numbers 1011616699832 and 1011623239706. Broadly, these each confirm that there should be no tax resettlement on the change of an appointor where –

• The relevant trust deed provides the appointor with the power to nominate new appointors and also allows for the resignation of an appointor;
• The intended change complies with the trust deed (the "read the deed" mantra again highlighted);
• The proposed amendment is otherwise analogous with the changing of a trustee and is thus essentially procedural in nature; and
• The original intention of the settlor is not changed such that there will not be any change to the beneficiaries, the obligations of the trustee or the terms or nature of the trust.

Clark case

The conclusion that there should be no adverse tax consequences on changing an appointor is also supported by the decision in FCT v Clark [2011] FCAFC 5 ("Clark") and which has been profiled previously in this blog.

In particular, the Full Federal Court in Clark held that significant changes to a trust instrument would not of themselves cause a resettlement of the trust for tax purposes, so long as there is a continuum of property and membership, that can be identified at any time, even if different from time to time. That meant that, in Clark, although there had been a change of trustee, a change of control of the trust, a change in the trust assets and a change in the unitholders of the trust between 2 income years, this did not trigger a resettlement for tax purposes.

Rather, it is only where a trust has been effectively deprived of all assets and then 're-endowed', that a resettlement will occur.

While the Tax Office released a Taxation Determination (namely TD 2012/21) following Clark, it unfortunately does not provide any specific commentary around when the Tax Office will deem changes to an appointor or principal of a trust to amount to a capital gains tax event under CGT events E1 and E2 (ie a resettlement).

Rather, in broad terms, the Tax Office simply states that unless variations cause a trust to terminate, then there will be no resettlement for tax purposes.

While a number of examples are provided, which give some guidance around issues such as changes of beneficiaries and updates to address distribution of trust income, the examples ignore issues such as changing appointors and multiple changes (for example, changing beneficiaries, the trustee and the appointor as part of an estate planning exercise).

As usual, please make contact if you would like access to any of the content mentioned in this post.

The above post is based on an article that we originally contributed to the Weekly Tax Bulletin

** For the trainspotters, the title of today's post is riffed from the John Lennon song ‘Just like starting over’.

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One way or another** way to convert water into wine - trust to company rollovers

The vast majority of rollovers available under the Tax Act relate to transactions between companies.

There is however a series of transactions that effectively allows one form of structure to be converted into another.

Following last week’s post, I was reminded of one of the very few rollovers that allows the iteration from one legal structure to another. In particular, the tax rollover available for a discretionary trust that allows a trust to transfer all of its assets into a company, so long as the shares in the company are owned by that same discretionary trust. This form of rollover is available under Subdivision 122A of the 1997 Tax Act.

Obviously, there are stamp duty considerations in many states still that often need to be taken into account, however the rollover can be a very useful one in a wide range of circumstances to ensure no tax is triggered.

We have particularly seen it used proactively as part of a succession plan – it is often seen as easier to facilitate the transfer of shares in a company, as opposed to managing the control of a discretionary trust.

For those interested, our book ‘The Seven Foundations of Business Succession’ explores each of the key company and trust rollover concessions used in estate and succession planning.

As usual, please make contact if you would like access to any of the content mentioned in this post.

** For the trainspotters, the title of today's post is riffed from the Blondie song ‘One way or another’.

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Converting water into wine (or family trusts into fixed trusts) is way cool**

Previous View posts have considered various aspects of fixed trusts.

For a myriad of structuring issues, one issue that appears to be raised more regularly is whether it is possible to convert a family discretionary trust into a fixed trust.

This issue was considered some years ago by the Tax Office in Private Ruling Authorisation Number: 1012991136582. As usual, if you would like a copy of the ruling please let me know.

Broadly the factual matrix was as follows -

1. a 'standard' family trust held an asset;
2. the trust had a widely crafted power of variation;
3. he trustee resolved to make a capital distribution of the balance in the unrealised capital profits account to certain beneficiaries, with this amount left unpaid (ie meaning it was a debt owed by the trust to the beneficiaries);
4. by agreement there was then a conversion of the debts (and some other outstanding loans) to equity such that each of the relevant beneficiaries had a certain percentage of ‘equity’ in the trust;
5. relying on the power to vary, the trustee then amended the terms of the trust deed to convert it into a fixed unit trust.

After analysing the provisions of its Tax Determination in relation to resettlements (namely TD2012/21, see our previous post that explores this) the Tax Office confirms that so long as the amendments are within the powers of the trust deed, the continuity of the trust will be maintained for trust law purposes.

This is because the ultimate beneficiaries of the trust after the proposed amendments would be the individuals who were the objects of the trust before the variation. The fact that the extent of the interests of the beneficiaries in the trust change as a result of the variation was seen as irrelevant.

Therefore, the amendments to the terms of the trust did not trigger capital gains tax (CGT) event E1 or CGT event E2, being the 'resettlement' CGT events.

CGT event E1 happens if a trust is created over a CGT asset by declaration or settlement.

CGT event E2 happens if a CGT asset is transferred to an existing trust.

The Tax Office further confirmed that CGT event E5 was not triggered by the conversion of a family trust to a fixed trust.

CGT event E5 happens if a beneficiary becomes absolutely entitled to a CGT asset of a trust as against the trustee despite any legal disability of the beneficiary.

CGT event E5 does not however happen if the trust is a unit trust and thus this exemption was held to apply here.

The Tax Office also confirmed that there are no other CGT events that happened when the family trust was converted into a unit trust. This is because the amendments were within the trustee's powers contained in the trust instrument. This means that the continuity of the trust was maintained for trust law purposes.

A similar conclusion was reached by the Tax Office in Private Ruling Authorisation Number 1051886979078.

The above post is based on an article that originally was published in the Weekly Tax Bulletin.

As usual, please make contact if you would like access to any of the content mentioned in this post.

** For the trainspotters, the title of today's post is riffed from the King Missile song ‘Jesus was way cool'.

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Another (one bites the dust**) & permutation on reading the deed - regulating family trust assets via wills

The View post last week considered aspects of the probation on a trustee fettering its discretion.

One related issue that we see arise from time to time is an attempt to regulate the distribution of the assets of a trust via a will direction. Generally this approach is adopted on the basis that some argue that a will can have legal force over a trust.

The idea that a willmaker can mandate that a company take certain steps in relation to its assets is clearly untenable (even if the will maker is the sole director and shareholder of the company). The analogous argument that a will maker can somehow force a trust to take certain steps seems (at least conservatively) similarly without basis.

In any event, if the outcome of mandating certain trust distributions is required, a simple deed of variation, with an effective date of the willmaker’s death arguably achieves the same outcome, without any of the esoteric debate about whether a willmaker can regulate trust distributions.

While we do from time to time adopt the ‘delayed commencement’ deed of variation approach we generally recommend against it as it goes against virtually all the benefits of having a discretionary trust in the first place (quite aside from the significant tax and duty risks of such a variation).

Instead, our strong preference is to use one or more of strategies such as memorandums of directions, crafting control roles (such as appointor or principal powers), family councils, bespoke constitutions, trust splitting, trust cloning, independent trustees or gift & loan back arrangements to achieve the required objectives.

As usual, please make contact if you would like access to any of the content mentioned in this post.

** For the trainspotters, the title of today's post is riffed from the Queen song ‘Another one bites the dust’.

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When a fettering of trustee discretion is obscured by a 90-Mile water wall**

A recent View post mentioned the principle in relation to the probation on a trustee fettering its discretion. Arguably the leading case explaining when the probation on fettering of discretion will essentially be ignored is Dagenmont Pty Ltd v Lugton [2007] QSC 272. As usual, if you would like a copy of the decision please contact me.

The background in this case was as follows -

1. an agreement was entered into by the original appointor of a discretionary trust and other family members in control of the corporate trustee, whereby the appointor would resign from various roles in the trust, in return for guaranteed distributions from the trust;
2. the distributions were set at an amount of $150,000 each year, indexed for inflation;
3. the agreement by the trustee to make these future distributions was effectively a fetter on its future discretion;
4. each party received independent legal advice at the time of the agreement, however some years later the trustee attempted to cease the distributions due to the, argued, invalid fettering of its discretion.

The court specifically acknowledged the general prohibition on a trustee fettering its discretion, confirming -

'trustees cannot fetter the future exercise of powers vested in trustees … any fetter is of no effect. Trustees need to be properly informed of all relevant matters at the time they come to exercise their relevant power.'

In rejecting however the trustee's attempt to avoid the agreement the court confirmed -

1. a provision in a document authorising a trustee to release powers which they would otherwise have a duty to exercise is valid;
2. here the document confirming the agreement between the parties was in essence a release by the trustee of the power conferred on to exercise an unfettered discretion to distribute amongst all potential beneficiaries;
3. alternatively, the agreement effectively amounted to a variation of the terms of the original trust deed;
4. this meant that what would otherwise have been an unfettered trustee discretion became reduced in scope, simultaneously with an obligation being imposed on the trustee (created by the agreement with the original appointor) to distribute the annual amount of $150,000 (indexed);
5. arguably particularly where parties receive independent advice at the time, the court should uphold bargains where it can, rather than destroy them.

As usual, please make contact if you would like access to any of the content mentioned in this post.

** For the trainspotters, the title of today's post is riffed from the National song ’90-Mile Water Wall’.

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Thinking you will let the tax tail wag the dog; plan to play a slow hand**

Last week's post explored the case of Wheatley v Lakshmanan [2022] NSWSC 583, with a focus on the (possible) exception to the rule that a willmaker can only regulate the transfer of assets they personally own under a will.

Another key aspect of the decision related to the tax consequences of the various proposals considered by the court. The potential tax liability was said to be in the region of $1M.

Relying on advice of a specialist tax adviser the court made the following observations (in the context of the implications of a company owned by the willmaker distributing one of its assets to a beneficiary under the will):

1. the estate, for tax purposes, would be deemed to be a trust under section 6(1) of the Tax Act;
2. any payment of any amount by the company to the executor of the estate would be a dividend assessable under section 44 or under Division 7A of the Tax Act - and, if the moneys were paid to the executor who then used them to pay the purported gift under the will, the recipient of the gift would be subject to income tax on a flow through basis;
3. if instead the company distributed to the estate and no particular beneficiary was eligible to receive those moneys, then the trustee would be taxed (at the highest marginal rate) under section 99A of the Tax Act;
4. an argument that the payment by the company to the beneficiary as a form of notional estate order would not constitute a deemed dividend had been rejected by the Tax Office in a private ruling issued before the trial - the Tax Office instead determining that the payment would in fact be treated as a deemed dividend under Division 7A;
5. although not expressly stated in the decision, it seems likely that the relevant private binding ruling in this regard is Authorisation Number 1051799201069. This ruling references Taxation ruling TR 2014/5 (Income Tax: matrimonial property proceedings and payments of money or transfers of property by a private company to a shareholder (or their associate)) in concluding that the reasoning from a family law perspective also applies in the succession law setting, and as such, the requirement in section 109J(b) of the Tax Act to access an exemption from the deemed dividend regime is not satisfied;
6. the use of the word in the gift provision of the will 'unencumbered' was held to be intended to be in its common parlance - that is referring to mortgages or charges secured on the property – not the embedded tax liability. Thus, any income tax liability should be largely ignored by the court in determining the appropriate provision to be made for the aggrieved beneficiary. This conclusion was reinforced by the fact that the tax liability only arose subsequent to the sale of the property, on the distribution of the proceeds of sale - and furthermore the purported gift was held to be invalid in any event.

The court also observed that it seemed likely that tax issues 'overtook' common sense during the litigation and contributed to the high level of legal and accounting costs, which the court stated it was inclined to place a significant cap on in terms of what the estate would be liable to pay for.

The exact cap in this regard was confirmed in Wheatley v Lakshmanan (No 2) [2022] NSWSC 851. In this subsequent decision, the court held that in relation to costs that were over $620,000 for the plaintiff and more than $450,000 for the estate, the estate was ultimately effectively required to pay its own costs and a net amount of $160,000 of the plaintiff's costs.

This outcome was after a careful analysis by the court balancing between depriving the plaintiff of a substantial portion of the legacy ordered in her favour and the estate being further burdened by costs. Given the plaintiff received an award of $820,000 as further provision under the initial judgment, her final net position was likely in the region of $350,000.

As usual, please make contact if you would like access to any of the content mentioned in this post.

** For the trainspotters, the title of today's post is riffed from the Pointer Sisters song ‘Slow hand’.

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Don't give up** (& no it ain’t an April Fool’s post) on receiving an asset under a will - even if it is not owned by the willmaker

Previous View posts have explored cases that support an, arguably unusual (indeed arguably bordering on a joke, or at least April Fool’s Day-esk, exception to the rule that a willmaker can only regulate the transfer of assets they personally own under a will.

In particular, in certain situations the standard position that assets of a company are not something individual shareholders have the authority to regulate under their will has been overruled.

The decision in Wheatley v Lakshmanan [2022] NSWSC 583 provides a detailed analysis of the key rules in this area.

At the heart of the factual matrix in this case was a clause in a will that purported to gift to a child of the willmaker, unencumbered, a commercial property - with a further direction that the property 'be placed into a trust or superannuation fund of (the child's) choice'.

The relevant property however was owned by a company that the willmaker was at all material times (i.e. both at the date of the making the will and at the date of death) the sole shareholder.

In confirming that the purported gift of the property was ineffective the court stated:

1. the general position is that a willmaker can not bequeathe something that they do not own;
2. it may be that where a willmaker conveys to the executor a direction to reduce into possession an asset not owned by the willmaker, and the executor is armed by the willmaker with the power to get the asset (eg by directing that all relevant assets are to be held on trust under the estate) they will be bound to do so - and then deal with the asset as directed by the will (see Re O’Callaghan [1972] VR 248);
3. that is, if there is the conferral of power upon executors to deal with shares in a company that owns the assets in question as if they were beneficial owners, coupled with express gifts under the will, this can give rise to an implication that the trustee was required to use the shares of the company to ensure the assets of the company are transferred as set out in the will;
4. this said, the court commented that it may also be that the earlier cases were in fact decided incorrectly - a point the court did not need to resolve on the basis that in the will here, the requisite power was not granted to the executor of the will in any event;
5. the key reason for suggesting that the previous cases may be wrong at law is that they are vague in clarifying how exactly an executor exercising rights as a shareholder can cause the relevant company to divest itself of the assets purportedly bequeathed. That is, the shareholders do not manage the company’s affairs; rather the directors do and a court should not construe a will in a manner that would or might place the directors in a position where their statutory duties as directors are in conflict with the willmaker's intentions, based on a conflation of ownership with management (or day-to-day conduct) of a company;
6. the further suggestion that there should be a rectification of the will was also rejected due to a lack of evidence that the willmaker intended to create the power for the executor to achieve the gift of the property owned by the company;
7. nor was there any evidence supporting the ability for the court to correct a 'clerical error' - rather it seemed that either the willmaker did not make clear, or the lawyer drafting the will did not understand, that the property in question was owned via a company.

Ultimately, while the aggrieved beneficiary was granted a cash settlement pursuant to a court order as part of a family provision application, this amount was significantly less than the value of the property in question; and was also arguably partially reduced by a tax bill that the estate had to bear. The tax issues will be explored in next week's post.

** For the trainspotters, the title of today's post is riffed from the Peter Gabriel (featuring Kate Bush) song ‘Don’t give up’.

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(I will follow**) the leading case about fettering of a trustee’s discretion

Previous View posts have considered the issues of a trustee fettering its discretion in the context of an insurance funded buy sell arrangement.

The principle in relation to the probation on a trustee fettering its discretion is arguably best captured in the decision of Fitzwood Pty Ltd v Unique Goal Pty Ltd (in liquidation) [2001] FCA 1628.

In this case the key concepts concerning fettering were summarised as follows –

‘… a trustee is not entitled to fetter the exercise of a discretionary power (for example a power to sale) in advance: Thacker v Key (1869) LR 8 Eq 408; In re Vestey’s Settlement [1951] Ch D 209.

If the trustee makes a resolution to that effect, it will be unenforceable, and if the trustee enters into an agreement to that effect, the agreement will not be enforced (Moore v Clench (1875) 1 Ch D 447), though the trustee may be liable in damages for breach of contract …’

Thus in the case mentioned above of In re Vestey’s Settlement, a binding decision to indefinitely make set annual distributions to a particular beneficiary was held to generally be seen as invalid due to the rule against fettering.

The decision in Lambert and Commissioner of Taxation [2013] AATA 442, another case featured in other View posts, further reinforces the above points.

In this case the court confirmed that a trustee is under a fiduciary duty to exercise its powers and discretions upon real and genuine consideration in accordance with the purposes for which the discretion was conferred.

In particular, as confirmed in Karger v Paul [1984] VR 161, it as an inherent requirement of the exercise of any discretion that it be given real and genuine consideration, or as set out in Partridge v The Equity Trustees Executors and Agency Company Limited [1947] HCA 42, there must be the 'exercise of an active discretion'.

Other examples in this regard include:

1. the granting of a call option under a lease for the lessee to buy the property was an invalid fetter on the ability for the trustee to sell the property (see: Re Stephenson's Settled Estates (1906) 6 SR (NSW) 420). This outcome should be contrasted to the conclusion in last week's post, where the trust deed expressly allows a trustee to grant options.
2. an attempt by a willmaker to mandate via a letter of wishes about how distributions from a testamentary trust set up under the will should made, was an invalid fetter on the trustee's wide discretionary powers for the trustee under the will (see: Burns v Burns & Anor [2008] QSC 173). Specifically it was confirmed that trustees (and third parties) cannot fetter the future exercise of the trustee’s powers. Any fetter is of no effect. Trustees need to be properly informed of all relevant matters at the time they come to exercise their relevant power.
3. as an example in contrast, it has been held that more general statements about the preferred manner of a trustee exercising its discretion - that do not in fact create a binding obligation on the trustee - are not an invalid fetter. Simply because a trustee consistently, and every year for many years in a row, follows an identical approach in determining how to exercise its discretion, this will not automatically mean the trustee has forgone having any real choice (see: Entrust Pension Ltd v Prospect Hospice Ltd [2013] PLR 73, [37]).

Next week's post will consider one of the leading cases where an arrangement that would have been under the above principles amounted to a breach of the rule against fettering of a trustee’s discretion was in fact enforced.

As usual, please make contact if you would like access to any of the content mentioned in this post.

** For the trainspotters, the title of today's post is riffed from the U2 song 'I will follow’.

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Seven dwarves, pizzas for the homeless and pre-chopped broccoli florets** – taking the detail to a whole new level

Following last week’s post, where I mentioned that, particularly in New South Wales, it is often the case that trustees are expressly prohibited from being beneficiaries of discretionary trusts there were a number of questions relayed to me. Thank you also for the suggestions as to what hair product Van Halen would have likely demanded at the height of their fame in the mid 1980s.

The key reason the ‘trustee can’t be a beneficiary’ prohibition is so prevalent in New South Wales is that under the stamp duty laws there, in order for a trustee to be permitted to be appointed (particularly where there is a change of trustee of a pre-existing trust), that trustee must not be a potential beneficiary of the trust.

Obviously, there are a range of asset protection related issues in this regard as well. At the centre of these issues is the fact that a trustee is directly liable for misadventures of the trust. As a general rule, the maximum value of a trustee company from time to time should never be more than a nominal amount – ie $2. A trustee company receiving distributions as a corporate beneficiary will breach this rule immediately.

Importantly however, many trust deed providers that offer deeds nationally, will incorporate the prohibition on a trustee being a potential beneficiary, even for trusts that do not otherwise have any connection with New South Wales.

This prohibition will often be weaved into a trust instrument in a less than obvious manner. Unless there is a pedantic approach to reviewing the terms of a trust deed the prohibition will be missed.

In summary – yet another example of the importance of the mantra ‘read the deed’.

As usual, if you would like access to any of the content mentioned in this post please contact me.

** for the trainspotters, the singer of the theme song of ‘Trainspotting’, being ‘Lust for Life’ Iggy Pop allegedly had a contract rider requiring seven dwarves, pizzas to give to the homeless, and pre-chopped broccoli florets (to make them easier to throw away).

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Brown M&Ms, go jump**invasion by aliens and when trust beneficiaries aren’t beneficiaries

In preparing for the View webinar ‘Trust Horror Stories’ we had a timely reminder of the mantra to ‘read the deed’.

The read the deed mantra is analogous to the famous contract rider of rock band Van Halen requiring M&Ms in their dressing room; with all the brown ones removed.

Originally thought to be the very definition of an outlandish group of prima donnas, the truth was all about the detail – if Van Halen ever saw brown M&Ms on arrival at a venue they were on notice that the venue operator did not sweat the detail.

On more than one occasion they used the existence of a brown M&M as cause for cancelling a gig; or perhaps more bluntly, telling the venue to go ‘Jump’.

Contract lawyers have long been renowned for a similar technique when crafting ‘force majeure’ provisions and randomly including events such as inability to complete a contract due to invasion by aliens or abduction by unicorns to flush out those who are not checking every line.

In the trust deed example we had this week, a trustee company had been distributing income from a trust to itself as a corporate beneficiary (ie to cap the tax rate at 30%).

Aside from the asset protection issues that can arise from using a corporate trustee as a corporate beneficiary, the other main issue to consider was whether the company could in fact be a beneficiary of the trust – in other words did the deed include the trustee as a beneficiary.

As is quite often the case with trusts established in New South Wales (in particular), in this instance, the trustee was in fact expressly excluded as a potential beneficiary of the trust. A previous post has a more detailed analysis of this aspect of many trust deeds (please contact me if you would like access to this and can not easily locate it).

The invalid distribution, which unfortunately had been made over a number of years, meant that a range of quite complex issues arose in relation to the trust, with a multitude of tax, trust law and accounting issues needing to be addressed. The solutions available for each issue were, at best, problematic.

As usual, please make contact if you would like access to any of the content mentioned in this post.

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They're 18, they’re beautiful and they're no longer ‘yours’

One regularly asked question in estate planning is ‘do my kids need estate planning documents?’.

The one word answer is – absolutely.

The more detailed answer to provide some context is as follows:

1. Assuming a person otherwise has mental capacity, they are entitled to implement estate planning documents on reaching the age of majority (i.e. 18 years).
2. The main exception to this rule is that a married person may implement estate planning documents, even if they have not reached the age of majority.
3. If a person has reached the age of majority, but does not have estate planning documents in place, an array of complications can arise.
4. If the person dies, then their estate will be administered in accordance with the intestacy rules (previous posts have looked at various aspects of these rules, please contact me if you would like access to these and can not easily locate them).
5. Invariably, the intestacy rules trigger a ‘triple whammy’ – significantly more costs, significant time delays and often a distribution that does not reflect the wishes of the deceased.
6. Where a young adult loses capacity, the adverse consequences for the family can in some cases be even more traumatic than a person dying intestate.
7. In particular, without an enduring power of attorney, it is essentially a government department that has the default right to make the decisions on behalf of the incapacitated person.
8. While there is a statutory process that allows interested parties (for example, parents of the young adult) to have themselves appointed, this again invariably causes a ‘triple whammy’ of increased costs, increased delays and the risk that the preferred people are not in fact appointed.

Unfortunately, we have seen a myriad of horror stories involving young adults without any estate planning arrangements in place, for example:

1. A 21-year-old who died with over $1 million in assets. These assets were as a result of being a member of multiple superannuation funds that she had joined working in a range of casual positions during university. Each fund had automatic insurance, regardless of the member balance, that totalled over $1 million. 50% of these entitlements went to the lady’s estranged father whom she had not even spoken to for over 15 years.
2. A 19-year-old man who had been gifted over $300,000 by his parents to help acquire his own unit. On his death the unit passed to a lady who claimed to be his de facto, but whom the parents had never in fact met.
3. An 18-year-old man who was left stranded in an incapacitated state in Spain following an accident at the ‘running of the bulls’. As his parents were not appointed as his enduring attorney, they had no legal authority recognised by the Spanish authorities.

As a separate comment - the popularity of recent posts leveraging pop references has been used again, with a song, the most popular version arguably recorded by Beatle’s drummer Ringo Starr.

** For the trainspotters, the title of today's post is riffed from the song ‘You’re sixteen, you’re beautiful and you’re mine’.

View arguably the most popular version recorded by Beatle’s drummer Ringo Starr here:

Estate planning and organ donation**

Last week’s post considered a number of different alternatives in relation to body disposal following death.

As is well known, it is possible to donate organs for medical purposes, which in Australia is via an opt in process and requires registration on the Australians Organ Donor Register.

Renowned behavioural economist Dan Ariely (among others) has commented on the level of organ donation in jurisdictions where there is an opt out approach adopted – in these jurisdictions, the level of uptake is astronomically higher.

It is important to note that generally if a person wishes to make their organs or body available for medical research, there are specific additional steps that must be taken, prior to death, to ensure that the necessary consents are provided.

As usual, please make contact if you would like access to any of the content mentioned in this post.

** For the trainspotters, the title of today's post is riffed from the Wonder Stuff song ‘Donation’.

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Keith Richards, estate planning, body disposal and keeping it Respectable**

Last week’s post mentioned Keith Richards and it reminded me of one death-related story that Keith Richards is famous (or perhaps more accurately infamous) for. In particular, the way that Keith Richards (allegedly) disposed of his father’s ashes, as profiled in more detail below.

Certainly, one aspect of estate planning that often receives less attention than many other areas is body disposal.

Ideally, a will maker’s wishes in relation to body disposal should be communicated to immediate family members or the executor of the estate.

A memorandum of directions, letter of wishes or similar style document is often the best mechanism in this regard.

At least in western culture, the three most traditional body disposal approaches are:

1. burial;
2. cremation;
3. burial at sea.

Some alternative approaches include the following, which can all be accessed via Dr Google:

1. Diamonds
2. Mummification
3. Cryogenically frozen
4. Coral reefs
5. Composting
6. Deluxe cardboard box
7. Vinyl records
8. Firecrackers
9. Snorting (ie the Keith Richards play; note - the mixing of ashes with illicit substances is generally regarded as optional)
10. Smoking – as a variation on the snorting idea, friends of rap singer Tupac allegedly mixed his ashes with marijuana and smoked them
11. An hour glass
12. Glass orb
13. Snow Globes
14. Space flight (as made famous by James Doohan, the actor who played Scotty in Star Trek, whose ashes were sent into space on a Elon Musk SpaceX rocket launch)
15. Shot out of a cannon – Hunter S. Thompson style, perhaps helping deliver on his famous comment that:

‘Life should not be a journey to the grave with the intention of arriving safely in a pretty and well preserved body, but rather to skid in broadside in a cloud of smoke, thoroughly used up, totally worn out, and loudly proclaiming "Wow! What a Ride!”’

** For the trainspotters, the title of today's post is riffed from the Rolling Stones song 'Respectable'.

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Pre-nups, (cosmic) pole dancers** and PI insurance

The saga involving swimmer Grant Hackett suing two law firms for negligence is a high profile reminder of the difficulties in relation to 'pre-nups'.

Broadly the Hackett matter centred on allegations that the relevant law firms failed to properly advise him to create a binding financial agreement.

In particular, Hackett argued that the original agreement entered into before marriage failed to comply with the strict legal requirements under the Family Law Act. When the agreement was later updated after the birth of the couple's twin children the alleged difficulties with the agreement were not remedied.

In many respects the issues here are analogous to the relatively well known 'pole dancer' case of Wallace v Stelzer [2014] HCATrans 135 - so named because the husband met the wife at what was described as 'an adult entertainment venue' where the wife was working as a dancer. As usual, if you would like copies of the relevant decisions please email me.

At the heart of the pole dancer case was the husband's desire to avoid the terms of the binding financial agreement that saw him liable to pay $3million dollars to his former wife when their marriage ended after only 18 months.

Some of the arguments raised included that the lawyers failed to discharge their duty to properly explain the terms of the agreement - an allegation that would have seen the lawyers potentially liable in negligence if it had been held to be correct.

It was also argued that the agreement was void in relation to some technical aspects required to be complied with under the Family Law Act and that attempted legislative fixes to the rules were also invalid, in part because the changes purported to be retrospective.

While it was ultimately held that the agreement was effective and the legislative changes were valid the extent of the litigation has seen many law firms, even those that specialise solely in family law, choose to no longer prepare binding financial agreements.

As usual, please make contact if you would like access to any of the content mentioned in this post.

** For the trainspotters, the title of today's post is riffed from the T-Rex song 'Cosmic Dancer'.

View a version by Nick Cave here: 

Death Defying**: AKA Contribution reserving

Contribution reserving has for many years been largely viewed as a strategy that in most instances will be too aggressive to comply with the approach the Tax Office is comfortable with in this space.

This said, the Tax Office Determination (TD) 2013/22 does appear to confirm that, subject to the governing rules of an SMSF trust deed, some basic contribution reserving can occur.

In particular, assuming the trust deed and the fund’s reserving strategy, are complied with, then TD 2013/22 supports an approach along the following lines:

1. a fund member can make a contribution to a SMSF that is double their concessional contribution cap in the one financial year;
2. half of the contribution can then be applied to, for example, an 'unallocated contribution account'. Arguably, an unallocated contribution account is analogous to a reserve account;
3. the other half would then be counted towards the relevant member's concessional contribution cap for the first financial year; and
4. in the second financial year, the trustees of the fund would resolve to allocate the amount applied to the unallocated contribution account to the relevant member and it would then be applied to that member's concessional contribution cap in the subsequent year - i.e. the year of actual allocation.

As usual, please make contact if you would like access to any of the content mentioned in this post.

** for the trainspotters, the title today is riffed from the Hoodoo Gurus song 'Death Defying'.

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