Half your age, plus seven**

Many family lawyers will relay that there appears to be a disproportionate level of relationship difficulties where there is a significant gap in the ages of the spouses - hence the above quoted rule of thumb to ensure the age gap is no more than half you age, plus seven years.

In Alderton v C of T [2015] AATA 807) the rule of thumb was breached by around 10 years (the de facto husband, Trapperton, was 42 to and the de facto wife, Alderton, was 18 when the relationship commenced).

Alderton was financially dependent on Trapperton.

For some years, a trust that Trapperton was trustee of made distributions to Alderton. Alderton had no knowledge of the existence of the trust nor that withdrawals from her debit card and online banking were in fact trust distributions.

After the relationship ended, a trust return was filed that based on the distributions caused an assessment for Alderton.

Alderton then, some years later, attempted to disclaim the income she had, unwittingly, received from the trust.

The Tax Office, and in turn the court, ignored the attempted disclaimer and Alderton remained liable to pay the tax assessed.

The fact that Alderton had no knowledge of the conduct or operations of trust was irrelevant as to her liability to pay tax on the distributions she had effectively been made presently entitled to.

As set out in earlier posts (please contact me if you would like access to these and can not easily locate them) in order for a disclaimer to be made retrospectively, it must be done so within a reasonable period of time from the beneficiary first becoming aware of the relevant interest that they wish to disclaim.

The disclaimer must also be an absolute rejection of the gift. Here, although the disclaimer was likely made 'in time', Alderton had in fact used the funds distributed to her and was therefore unable to provide an effective disclaimer.

This conclusion stood despite the court questioning the 'discreditable' conduct of the trustee in taking advantage of Alderton's naivety.

As usual, please make contact if you would like access to any of the content mentioned in this post.

** For the trainspotters, the title of today's post is riffed from the Taylor Swift song 'Seven'.

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When a fettering of trustee discretion is obscured by a 90-Mile water wall**

A recent View post mentioned the principle in relation to the probation on a trustee fettering its discretion. Arguably the leading case explaining when the probation on fettering of discretion will essentially be ignored is Dagenmont Pty Ltd v Lugton [2007] QSC 272. As usual, if you would like a copy of the decision please contact me.

The background in this case was as follows -

1. an agreement was entered into by the original appointor of a discretionary trust and other family members in control of the corporate trustee, whereby the appointor would resign from various roles in the trust, in return for guaranteed distributions from the trust;
2. the distributions were set at an amount of $150,000 each year, indexed for inflation;
3. the agreement by the trustee to make these future distributions was effectively a fetter on its future discretion;
4. each party received independent legal advice at the time of the agreement, however some years later the trustee attempted to cease the distributions due to the, argued, invalid fettering of its discretion.

The court specifically acknowledged the general prohibition on a trustee fettering its discretion, confirming -

'trustees cannot fetter the future exercise of powers vested in trustees … any fetter is of no effect. Trustees need to be properly informed of all relevant matters at the time they come to exercise their relevant power.'

In rejecting however the trustee's attempt to avoid the agreement the court confirmed -

1. a provision in a document authorising a trustee to release powers which they would otherwise have a duty to exercise is valid;
2. here the document confirming the agreement between the parties was in essence a release by the trustee of the power conferred on to exercise an unfettered discretion to distribute amongst all potential beneficiaries;
3. alternatively, the agreement effectively amounted to a variation of the terms of the original trust deed;
4. this meant that what would otherwise have been an unfettered trustee discretion became reduced in scope, simultaneously with an obligation being imposed on the trustee (created by the agreement with the original appointor) to distribute the annual amount of $150,000 (indexed);
5. arguably particularly where parties receive independent advice at the time, the court should uphold bargains where it can, rather than destroy them.

As usual, please make contact if you would like access to any of the content mentioned in this post.

** For the trainspotters, the title of today's post is riffed from the National song ’90-Mile Water Wall’.

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Birth, school, work, death** - SMSF trustee compliance on member death

Ensuring an SMSF continues to satisfy the rules in relation trusteeship following a member’s death can be problematic, particularly when specific strategies have not been implemented as part of a comprehensive estate plan.

As is well understood, a complying SMSF must have all individual trustees as members and vice versa.

Where an individual member dies the superannuation legislation allows 6 months for an SMSF to ensure compliance. Often, for funds that are established as 2 member funds, this is achieved via the appointment of a corporate trustee, with the remaining member as the sole director.

The superannuation rules also allow a grace period for non-compliance from the date of death until just before the death benefits commence to be paid, where the legal personal representative (LPR) can act as the replacement trustee.

Most modern SMSF trust deeds reflect the superannuation legislation and have a discretionary provision that automatically appoints the LPR as the trustee on the death of the member.

While there can be confusion about the way the rules work, the conservative position is that the 6 month grace period starts on the death of the member. Therefore, regardless of when the death benefit commences to be paid, the trusteeship must be valid no later than 6 months following the date of a member’s death.

Practically, as set out in earlier posts, these rules further highlight the benefits of having a corporate, as opposed to individual, trustee.

As usual, please contact me if you would like access to any of the content mentioned in this post.

** For the trainspotters, the title of today's post is riffed from the Godfathers song 'Birth, School, Work, Death'.

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Why?** will a court remove an executor

Posts over recent weeks have explored what issues a court will consider before a trustee of a trust is removed against their will.

Many of the themes mentioned are relevant to the issue of whether a court will remove an executor (or legal personal representative (LPR)) of a person’s will.

As a threshold issue, any person with an interest sufficient to entitle them to oppose an application for a grant of probate also has sufficient standing to seek revocation of a grant (see Re Hartley [2020] QSC 251).

As confirmed in Gardiner and Ors v Hughes and Anor [2017] VSCA 167 “…[I]n order to establish standing, an applicant for an order revoking a grant of probate or letters of administration must have a sufficient interest in the proceeding. Sufficiency of interest is established by showing that the applicant’s rights would or might be affected if the grant were to be revoked. The bare possibility of an interest will suffice."

The decision in Re Franks [2021] QSC 134 provides a useful summary of the key issues in this area.

In a situation where 2 executors were unable to agree on how to administer the estate (after a third executor had renounced their role due to the conflicts between the parties), one of the executors applied to the court for an independent executor to be appointed. Importantly, an executor can not resign without order of the court once probate had been granted. Furthermore, unless a law firm has joint instructions from the executors, they are unable to act.

The court confirmed:

1. Similar to its role when there is an application for removal of a trustee of a trust, at the highest level, the question for the court when considering the removal of an executor is what is in the best interest of the persons who have an interest in the estate, including creditors and beneficiaries, and its due administration.
2. A conflict between personal representatives is not solely determinative and there is no precondition of default on the part of any executor before the power of the court can be exercised (see Chesney & Anor v Tognola & Anor [2011] QSC 340).
3. Due regard must be paid to the willmaker's wishes as to the identity of their LPR, however it should not be assumed that a willmaker who was aware of potential disputes among beneficiaries will also have anticipated disputes among the executors (see Baldwin v Greenland [2007] 1 Qd R 117).
4. Ultimately, each case must turn on its own facts (see Re Flavel; Application by Lipshut [2018] VSC 228, Re McLennan [2018] QSC 124 and Mann Jnr v Grantham [2004] VSC 156).

Here there was held to be sufficient benefit in an independent administrator being appointed who would not need the agreement for joint action and who would not be compromised by conflicts of interest or personal interest. This was despite the nomination made by the willmaker in their will and the additional expenses the estate would incur.

As usual, if you would like access to any of the content mentioned in this post please contact me.

** For the trainspotters, the title of today's post is riffed from the Bronski Beat song 'Why?’.

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Court removal of trustees and appointors (who should hang their heads low)

Last week’s post explored what issues a court will consider before a trustee is removed against their will and mentions the (in)famous decision from the Lang Hancock and Gina Rinehart saga (namely Hancock v Rinehart [2015] NSWSC 646).

A related issue is whether a court will unilaterally remove an appointor or principal of a trust – that is a party who has the right under a trust deed to change the trustee.

The decision in McNee v Lachlan McNee Family Maintenance Pty Ltd [2020] VSC 273 is a useful reference point in this regard.

Relevantly the factual matrix was as follows:

1. A 12 year old son of former life spouses was the primary beneficiary of a child maintenance trust (a form of trust explored in other View posts that allows access to excepted trust income for infant beneficiaries following a relationship breakdown).
2. The mother was the sole director and shareholder of the trustee company and sole appointor of the trust until the son turned 18, at which time the deed mandated he would become the appointor.
3. The trust owned a residential property which the mother and son lived in, until their relationship fractured and the son moved in with his father.
4. The mother continued to live in the property owned by the trust (and had been given this right to occupy under the trust deed, as had the son) and the son (via his father) approached the court to remove the trustee and appointor and appoint an independent third party.

The court confirmed as follows:

1. as mentioned in last week's post, whether the court exercises its discretion to remove a trustee turns upon the circumstances of each case;
2. a lack of confidence in the trustee can be sufficient justification that the court should exercise its powers;
3. this said, here there were a range of reasons that meant removal as trustee was appropriate such as friction and hostility between the key parties, the trustee's failure to read and understand the trust deed, the trustee consciously acting in breach of the trust deed (including a failure to keep proper records), the trustee preferring the interests of others rather than the beneficiary, failure to exercise powers of investment for the benefit of the beneficiaries, failure to proactively address a clear position of conflict and a failure to offer any reasons for why an independent trustee would not be appropriate;
4. any one of the above reasons on its own may have been sufficient to justify removal, however in combination made the decision overwhelming in favour of removal;
5. the suggestion that a co-director could have been appointed to the trustee company was rejected as it would have failed to address the inappropriate conduct of the mother;
6. for similar reasons, the mother was also replaced as appointor of the trust, given that if she retained this role she could have later removed the independent trustee appointed by the court. In this regard, the court confirmed that where the trust instrument already contains an express power of appointment, the court has the ability to change the appointor. This outcome was contrasted with the decision in W E Pickering Nominees Pty Ltd v Pickering [2016] VSC 71 where it was held the court can not ‘grant’ a general power of appointment in circumstances where the trust instrument does not make any provision for an appointor;
7. the court confirmed that it was appropriate for the trustee and appointor to be the same person, given that the trust clearly established the settlor’s intention in settling a trust with a trustee whose controlling mind (ie being the mother as sole director) was also the appointor (again, the mother);
8. the trustee and appointor would be an independent third party, nominated by the President of the Law Institute; and
9. the mother was however entitled to continue to reside in the property subject to certain conditions. This said, the son (under the deed) would have the right once he turned 18 to terminate the trust (and thus end his mother's right to occupy).

As usual, please contact me if you would like access to any of the content mentioned in this post.

** For the trainspotters, the title of today's post is riffed from the Bananarama song 'Cruel Summer’.

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Court's unilaterally removing trustees - the Judge will carry the Weight**

Posts over the last 2 weeks have explored a number of aspects of the super death benefit case of Marsella.

One other key aspect of the case also explored what issues a court will consider before a trustee is removed against their will.

Another View post considers a number of the key issues in this regard, as explained in the decision about one aspect of the Lang Hancock and Gina Rinehart saga (namely Hancock v Rinehart [2015] NSWSC 646).

The Marsella case quotes the decision in Elovalis v Elovalis [2008] WASCA 141 and summarises the approach the courts must take in this area as follows:

1. In determining whether a trustee should be removed the chief consideration is the welfare of the beneficiaries.
2. The Court will have regard to the security of the trust property, the efficient and satisfactory execution of the trust and the faithful and sound exercise of powers conferred upon the trustee.
3. A breach of trust will not necessarily lead to the removal of a trustee, nor will the existence of a conflict between duty and interest.
4. At times, however, such factors may be sufficient to justify the trustee’s removal.
5. Ultimately, whether the Court exercises its discretion turns upon the circumstances of each case - or, as quoted from the case of Miller v Cameron (1936) 54 CLR 572:

'a judgment (to remove a trustee against their will) must be largely discretionary.

A trustee is not to be removed unless circumstances exist which afford ground upon which the jurisdiction may be exercised.

But in a case where enough appears to authorise the Court to act, the delicate question whether it should act and proceed to remove the trustee is one upon which the decision of a primary Judge is entitled to especial weight.'

Thus, in Owies and Owies v JJE Nominees Pty Ltd (ACN 004 856 366) (in its capacity as trustee for the Owies Family Trust) [2022] VSCA 142 (a case also featured in other View posts) the trustee was removed due to the court concluding that over a number of years the trustee had failed to:

1. act impartially;
2. give real and genuine consideration to the interests of two of the three primary beneficiaries;
3. appreciate that the relations between the beneficiaries and the trustee were irreconcilably damaged.

Therefore, it was not in the best interests of the beneficiaries for the trustee to continue in office.

Similarly, in JPD as Guardian v DMS as Trustee [2022] QSC 181 a trustee of testamentary trusts set up for infant children, who was a friend of the deceased mother, was removed by the court at the request of the father (who was divorced from the mother at the time of her death).

The reasons included the trustee:

1. demonstrating a pattern of holding a very low opinion of the father (who had no wealth and was not in paid employment) and giving no genuine weight to the importance of his position in the children’s lives as their sole guardian and surviving parent;
2. not making any attempt to consult with the father adequately;
3. unilaterally reducing income distributions to the children by around 75%;
4. purporting to evict the father and the children from a home owned by the trust, and requiring a move to a new property owned by the trust;
5. rejecting a request (which the court believed was reasonable) by the father to move the family to Brisbane;
6. regularly and inappropriately intervening in parenting aspects of the children.

As usual, please contact me if you would like access to any of the content mentioned in this post.

** For the trainspotters, the title of today's post is riffed from the Aretha Franklin song 'The Weight'.

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I want it all** - Duties of SMSF trustees and yet another case concerning death benefit payments

In recent years the number of reported decisions in relation to death benefit payments by SMSFs have increased significantly. This is particularly so given that for many years the only substantive decision was from 2005, namely the case of Katz v Grossman [2005] NSWSC 934.

The decision in Re Marsella; Marsella v Wareham (No.2) [2019] VSC 65 provides another example of the types of issues that need to be considered in this area, and is particularly interesting given that there were some aspects analogous with the Katz decision, and yet the court reached the opposite conclusion.

Briefly in the Marsella case:

1. the deceased was the sole member and a co-trustee with her daughter of an SMSF (similar to Katz);
2. while historically a binding nomination had been signed, it had lapsed; and in any event was invalid as it nominated the member's grandchildren (who were not dependants as defined under the superannuation laws);
3. the daughter appointed her husband as the co trustee following her mother's death (similar to Katz);
4. the deceased's will provided certain benefits to her second husband. All remaining assets under the estate then passed equally to her daughter and her son (similar to Katz);
5. the daughter and her husband resolved to distribute 100% of the death benefit to herself ignoring her brother (again similar to Katz) and her step father.

Unlike Katz, where the daughter was entitled to retain the entirety of the death benefit, in Marsella the payment was held to be invalid and the daughter and her husband were removed as trustees of the SMSF.

The court listed a number of reasons for reaching this conclusion, including:

1. the daughter acted arbitrarily in distributing the fund, with ignorance of, or insolence toward, her duties and the way in which the superannuation laws are structured in this area;
2. the daughter acted in the context of uncertainty, misapprehensions as to the identity of a beneficiary, her duties as trustee, and her position of conflict;
3. as a result she was not in a position to give real and genuine consideration to the interests of the dependants;
4. the above conclusion was supported by the outcome of the exercise of discretion, which itself was contrary to one of the daughter's key arguments - that being that her mother wanted the daughter and the brother (and the grandchildren) to benefit from the death benefit; and yet she paid 100% of the benefit to herself;
5. ultimately, the court believed that the outcome of the daughter's decision was ‘grotesquely unreasonable’ which helped support the conclusion that the discretion was never properly exercised, or was exercised in bad faith;
6. thus, the fact that the daughter was within the class of potential objects did not negate her duty to exercise the power in good faith, upon real and genuine consideration, and for proper purposes.

The above conclusions were upheld on appeal, and that decision will be explored in next week’s post.

As usual, please contact me if you would like access to any of the content mentioned in this post.

** for the trainspotters, an obvious choice, with Queen and 'I want it all'. 

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Hey!** It’s part III of the Ioppolo decision

Las week’s post looked at the original Ioppolo decision.

This post considers the subsequent appeal decision in Ioppolo & Hursford v Conti [2015] WASCA 45.

In broad terms, the appeal decision confirmed the original case, in particular:

1. It was confirmed that section 17A(3)(a) of the Superannuation (Industry) Supervision Act 1993 (SIS Act) does not obligate the trustee of an SMSF to appoint the legal personal representative of a member following that member’s death.
2. In other words, section 17A(3)(a) is a ‘permissive rather than mandatory' provision.
3. This meant that the surviving trustee was within their rights to appoint a corporate trustee (of which he was the sole director) and still comply with the SIS Act.
4. It was further confirmed that as the appointment took place within 6 months of the member’s death, then the fund was still complying for SIS Act purposes.
5. In also confirming that there was no lack of bona fides in the trustee’s decision, the court expressly commented that the subsequent signing by the deceased of a binding nomination (in favour of her husband) meant that it was reasonable to assume that the earlier made comments in her will (requesting that the death benefit pass to her children) had been superseded.

As usual, please contact me if you would like access to any of the content mentioned in this post.

** for the trainspotters, the title today is riffed from the Pixies song ‘Hey’.

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This is how to do it** - To disclose or not to disclose trusteeship?

The issue of whether the existence of a trust relationship should be disclosed to third parties, including banks and Titles Offices is one that comes up regularly.

The strict position from a trust law perspective is that the existence of a trust relationship does not need to be disclosed.

This said, there are a number of other factors that often need to be taken into account, including the following:

1. the Tax Office, in relation to superannuation funds, is of the view that the existence of a trust relationship should always be disclosed;
2. in some jurisdictions (New South Wales is a classic example), it is in fact not possible to disclose the existence of a trust on Titles Office records;
3. from an evidentiary perspective (for example, if the Tax Office is querying the way in which assets are held), it is often of significant benefit to have the trust arrangements supported by third party documentation;
4. where the trust instrument is lost, disclosing the trust and lodging a copy of it with a third party can often prevent significant costs and administrative difficulties that otherwise arise when a trust instrument cannot otherwise be located; and
5. finally, however, the non-disclosure of a trust relationship can be commercially important from a privacy perspective.

** for the trainspotters, the title here is riffed from the Katy Perry song ‘This is how we do’.

Mine, all mine** - Trustees and SMSF borrowing arrangements

Over the last couple of weeks, the posts have focused on the various issues that arise in relation to having the one company act as trustee for multiple trusts.

One area of the law where the ability to have the same company act as trustee for multiple trust relationships is prohibited is in relation to the limited recourse borrowing arrangements that self-managed superannuation funds can enter into.

Briefly, we confirmed to an adviser recently that in relation to these types of borrowing arrangements:

(a) the need to have a separate bare trust is driven by the requirement under section 67A of the Superannuation (Supervision) Industry Act that the borrowing arrangement relates to a ‘single acquirable asset’, meaning a separate trust must be established for each acquisition; and

(b) the bare trust needs to have a different trustee to the super fund because under trust law, if the sole trustee is also the sole beneficiary, the trust ‘merges’ and ceases to exist.

** for the trainspotters, the title here is riffed from the Portishead song ‘All Mine’.

Right by your side** - Commercial issues with trustees performing many roles

As mentioned in last week's post, it is possible for the same company to act as trustee for a number of trusts.

Such an arrangement should not change the indemnity position if a liability is incurred, however there are a number of commercial reasons that need to be considered before having the same company act as trustee for multiple trusts.

Some of the issues in this regard include:

1. While the current legal position is that the assets of each trust will be segregated if a liability was to arise, this position in theory could be changed by future cases or legislation. For obvious reasons, most clients do not want their arrangements to become a test case.
2. If litigation was to arise in relation to one trust, this would force the parties involved to change the trustee of the other trusts not otherwise subject to the litigation. This can be practically an unnecessarily difficult process that in some instances is actually challenged by the relevant creditors.
3. The costs for maintaining separate trustee companies are relatively nominal.
4. From an ease of administration perspective, having separate trustee companies for each separate trust can minimise the risk of confusion.
5. From a land tax grouping perspective, separate trustee companies can, in some jurisdictions, provide a planning opportunity to reduce the overall tax rates that apply.
6. If the company is acting as a trustee of a SMSF concessional ASIC annual fees are only available if the company performs this role solely.

** for the trainspotters, the title here is riffed from the Eurythmics song ‘Right by your side’.

Trustee companies and multiple plays**

Previous posts have looked at various issues that arise in relation to trustee companies (let me know if you would like access to any of these posts).

One issue that comes up relatively regularly is the way in which the trustee indemnity provisions work where the same company acts as trustee for multiple trusts.

Briefly, the strict legal position is that the right of indemnity of a trustee is limited to the assets of the trust in relation to which the liability was incurred.

In other words, where a company is a corporate trustee for multiple trusts, a claim or liability in relation to one trust should not expose the assets of the other trust.

Practically however, if the trustee becomes insolvent it can be difficult to establish the beneficial ownership of particular assets to the liquidator’s satisfaction, particularly given some third parties such as ASIC and the NSW Titles Office do not record the name of the beneficial owner.

There are a number of commercial issues that arise in relation to the same company acting as trustee for multiple trusts and some of these will be considered in next week's post.

** for the trainspotters, the title here is riffed from the John Lennon song that has a line mentioning multiple plays, namely ‘Beautiful Boy’.

Seven dwarves, pizzas for the homeless and pre-chopped broccoli florets** – taking the detail to a whole new level

Following last week’s post, where I mentioned that, particularly in New South Wales, it is often the case that trustees are expressly prohibited from being beneficiaries of discretionary trusts there were a number of questions relayed to me. Thank you also for the suggestions as to what hair product Van Halen would have likely demanded at the height of their fame in the mid 1980s (see – Brown M&Ms, invasion by aliens and when trust beneficiaries aren’t beneficiaries).

The key reason the ‘trustee can’t be a beneficiary’ prohibition is so prevalent in New South Wales is that under the stamp duty laws there, in order for a trustee to be permitted to be appointed (particularly where there is a change of trustee of a pre-existing trust), that trustee must not be a potential beneficiary of the trust.

Obviously, there are a range of asset protection related issues in this regard as well. At the centre of these issues is the fact that a trustee is directly liable for misadventures of the trust. As a general rule, the maximum value of a trustee company from time to time should never be more than a nominal amount – ie $2. A trustee company receiving distributions as a corporate beneficiary will breach this rule immediately.

Importantly however, many trust deed providers that offer deeds nationally, will incorporate the prohibition on a trustee being a potential beneficiary, even for trusts that do not otherwise have any connection with New South Wales.

This prohibition will often be weaved into a trust instrument in a less than obvious manner. Unless there is a pedantic approach to reviewing the terms of a trust deed the prohibition will be missed.

In summary – yet another example of the importance of the mantra ‘read the deed’.

As mentioned last week, our upcoming webinar ‘Trust Horror Stories’ will have many case study examples highlighting key issues to be aware of with managing trusts.

Find out more here - https://viewlegal.com.au/product/webinar-trust-horror-stories/

Watch the promo video below.

** for the trainspotters, the author of the theme song of ‘Trainspotting’, being ‘Lust for Life’ (see - https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jQvUBf5l7Vw) Iggy Pop allegedly had a contract rider requiring seven dwarves, pizzas to give to the homeless, and pre-chopped broccoli florets (to make them easier to throw away). Again there is a prize for anyone who can share a more unique list of riders.

Pierce the veil and the Domino Theory

As alluded to in last week’s post, utilising a corporate trustee as the corporate beneficiary of a trust can be a problematic approach.

Aside from difficulties that often arise in relation to whether the company is in fact a beneficiary under the terms of the deed, a significant issue also exists from an asset protection perspective.

In particular, given a trustee is directly liable for all activities of the trust (subject to an indemnity against the assets of the trust), where the effort has been made to appoint a corporate trustee, it is always preferable to ensure the total assets of that corporate trustee in its own right are limited to a nominal amount (for example $2).

Where a corporate trustee has been used as a corporate beneficiary (even if the distributions remain outstanding as an unpaid present entitlement), the value immediately becomes significantly more than $2.

While steps can generally be taken to ‘unwind’ the adverse aspects of distributing to a corporate trustee, as with many adjacent areas of the law, prevention is always better than the cure.

Image courtesy of Shutterstock

Corporate trustees and SMSFs

Many specialist advisers to self managed superannuation funds (SMSFs) recommend the use of a corporate trustee, as opposed to individual trustees.

While the initial setup costs of a corporate trustee are generally higher than individuals, there are a range of reasons that the use of a company is beneficial, including:

1. as other posts have demonstrated, the use of a corporate trustee provides limited liability protection. This can be particularly important if the SMSF owns real property; 
2. special purpose corporate trustees of an SMSF are entitled to discounted annual ASIC fees; 
3. record keeping and compliance is significantly improved with a special purpose corporate trustee in terms of what the auditor (and ultimately the Tax Office) expects to see; 
4. from a succession planning perspective, it is significantly easier to regulate the control of a corporate trustee (i.e. by simply changing the directors from time to time) as opposed to individual trustees, where each time an individual trustee changes, there is often a myriad of documentation that needs preparing and notifications that must be made; and 
5. particularly in relation to sole member funds, the use of a corporate trustee significantly simplifies the overall structure of a SMSF, as a sole director company is permissible. In contrast, it is impossible to create a valid SMSF with an individual trustee and sole member (there must always be an additional individual who acts as a co-trustee in this instance). 

Until next week.

Stamp duty on changes of trustee

One issue that is coming up increasingly regularly is changing trustees of either family trusts or self managed superannuation funds.

Generally, there are no tax consequences on the change of trustee for any form of trust (including a superannuation fund).

In each Australian State, there are also provisions that provide a stamp duty rollover on the change of trusteeship.

Care must always be taken however to review at least two issues from a stamp duty perspective.

Firstly, care must be taken to ensure that the correct state law is being applied. There can be complications in this regard where a trust is setup under one jurisdiction, but it has substantial assets in another state.

Once this threshold issue has been resolved, the exact provisions of the relevant stamp duty legislation need to be considered. While each state has similar provisions, there are differences. One example in this regard is that in New South Wales (among other things), any new trustee cannot be a potential beneficiary under the terms of the trust.

Until next week.

Read the deed - another reminder re invalid distributions

A structure diagram of the trust in Harris v Harris [2011] FamCAFC 245 

For those that do not otherwise have access to the Weekly Tax Bulletin, the article from last week extracted below.

Practitioners will be aware, from many previous articles in this Bulletin (and elsewhere), of the critical importance that trust deeds should be read before making any distribution of income or capital. While the "read the deed" mantra should be indelibly etched in practitioners' minds, regular reminders of the dangers of not doing this are not out of place.

One example of a family law case of Harris v Harris [2011] FamCAFC 245 where the range of potential beneficiaries was critical was profiled in our article at 2012 WTB 39 [1586].

In that case, the trial judge in a family court matter noted that the recipient of trust distributions (being a company), who was being challenged, was not in fact an eligible beneficiary of the relevant trust. If the company had been simply nominated as a potential beneficiary, then the distributions would have most likely been valid.

A more common example of where difficulties with invalid distributions arise, however, relates to where particular potential beneficiaries are in fact expressly excluded by the trust deed. The most common example in this regard is the exclusion of the trustee, be that the current, former or even a future trustee, from being a beneficiary of a trust.

These types of clauses are often found in deeds prepared by New South Wales advisers. This is primarily because s 54(3) of the Duties Act 1997 (NSW) limits the nominal duty exemption for a change of trustee to trust deeds that contain provisions ensuring that:

1. none of the continuing trustees remaining after the appointment of a new trustee are or can become a beneficiary under the trust; 
2. none of the trustees of the trust after the appointment of a new trustee are or can become a beneficiary under the trust; and 
3. the transfer is not part of a scheme for conferring an interest, in relation to the trust property, on a new trustee or any other person, whether as a beneficiary or otherwise, to the detriment of the beneficial interest or potential beneficial interest of any person. 

An example of a clause adopting an approach that ensures access to the stamp duty relief is as follows:

"The Trustee for the time being of the Trust can not be a beneficiary of the Trust. None of the continuing Trustees remaining after the retirement of a Trustee is or can become a beneficiary under the Trust, and none of the Trustees of the Trust after the appointment of a new Trustee is or can become a beneficiary under the Trust."

New South Wales is the only Australian jurisdiction that has this type of restriction on accessing the duty concessions for a change of trustee and, understandably, clauses drafted in this manner are extremely prevalent with deed providers or lawyers based in New South Wales.

In many instances, however, there may in fact be no other connection with New South Wales for anyone associated with the trust.

The risks created by this drafting approach will, therefore, often be less than obvious. Anecdotally, there would seem to be an increasing number of situations where invalid distributions are being discovered that stretch back over many years and involve significant levels of invalid distributions.The exact ramifications of this type of situation will depend on a range of issues, including how any default provision under the relevant trust deed is crafted. This said, an embracing by all advisers involved with the administration of the trust of the mantra "read the deed" would avoid the issue ever arising in the first place.

Until next week.

A further reminder – read the deed

As regular readers are aware, there have been numerous posts highlighting the importance of reading trust deeds and recently we had (yet another) reminder.

Many advisers would be aware that, particularly for deeds established in New South Wales (due to the stamp duty rules there), there is often a prohibition on any trustee, and in some instances any former trustee, being a beneficiary of a trust.

The example that came up again recently (it seems to be one that comes up every few weeks) involved an individual trustee of a standard family discretionary trust. That individual trustee was also the sole primary beneficiary and sole appointor.

While there were potential issues from an asset protection perspective that we were reviewing, the more fundamental concern was that under the trust deed the trustee was specifically prohibited from ever receiving any income or capital distributions. A brief review of the balance sheet of the trust showed that substantial distributions had in fact been made to the trustee as primary beneficiary over a number of years.

There are now a myriad of issues that the trustee and his adviser are needing to work through, not least of which being how to address the enquiries of the lawyers for the trustee’s former spouse who are alleging a breach of trust and what steps will need to be taken from a tax perspective in relation to the various years in which invalid distributions have taken place.

Until next week.

How should a partnership of discretionary trusts be structured?

As set out in earlier posts, and with thanks to the Television Education Network, today’s post addresses the issue of ‘How should a partnership of discretionary trusts be structured?’ by way of audio podcast (not video) at the following link - http://youtu.be/qPJJ_1NRwcw

As usual, a transcript of the presentation for those that cannot (or choose not) to listen to the presentation is below –

There's a number of aspects relevant here. 

The biggest one, if we pick up on that idea of it being a little bit of a messy structure, is that ideally there should be some sort of corporate entity that’s the face to the outside world.  We see that being used very regularly. 

Now whether that's a standalone nominee or agent company that’s appointed to act on behalf of all the trusts or whether in fact you just have one company acting as trustee for all of the trusts is probably a mute point. 

The outcome that’s delivered to the outside world is that they're not having to deal with numerous separate trusts; as far as the clients know, all they see is that standalone Pty Ltd company.  That would probably be the biggest thing. 

The other types of things that need to be thought about I guess are looking at the constitution of that company and making sure that you've got an appropriate balance between directorship powers and shareholder powers. 

You'd also obviously, particularly if you're going to use the same company as trustee for a number of trusts, need to have a fairly good understanding of how an appointor or principal or nominee type power under the trust documents work, to give everyone the comfort of knowing that they do have ultimate say over ‘their’ particular trust. 

Probably, the final point would be, and we've got recurring themes coming through here, (this harks back to this concept of asset protection) and that is, if you're serious about maintaining protection against issues that might go wrong in the practice, it would really be quite important in our view that the trust that is involved as a partner in the partnership of trusts do nothing else but be a partner in that partnership. 

So in other words, you don’t buy the investment property in that trust and you don't have a listed share portfolio in that trust, because otherwise you're potentially exposing all those passive assets to the risks of the business.

Until next week.

Appointor succession - read the deed

As highlighted in previous posts, it is critical to 'read the deed' when providing advice that involves a trust.

Following last week's post (and again with thanks to Tara Lucke) about Montevento Holdings, this post reinforces the importance of reading a trust deed before taking any step. 

In Montevento Holdings, a disgruntled beneficiary sought to rely on a technical interpretation of the way the appointor could exercise their power under the trust deed to change the trustee to support the argument that the change was ineffective. 

The relevant clause precluded individual appointors from personally being appointed as trustee.  As mentioned last week, the individual appointor appointed a company as trustee of which he was personally the sole director and shareholder. 

The High Court held that the ordinary and natural meaning of the clause was that an individual person holding the office of appointor could not personally appoint themselves as trustee.  However, because the trust deed consistently distinguished between individuals and companies, it did not prohibit the appointment of a corporate trustee, even if that trustee was controlled by the individual appointor.

Until next week.