Refinancing rules: ensure you & your client feel good**

One issue that arises regularly in relation to the taxation of trusts is the incurring of interest expenses by a trustee for external borrowings used to discharge an obligation to pay a monetary distribution to a beneficiary such as a credit loan or unpaid present entitlement (UPE).

The Tax Office has confirmed that the interest expense incurred in this style of situation will not be automatically deductible, even if the borrowed funds allows the trust to retain income producing assets.

Instead, in order for the interest to be deductible, the borrowings must be shown to be ‘sufficiently connected’ with the assessable income earning activity.

The leading case in this area is that of FC of T v. JD Roberts & Smith 92 ATC 4380 (Roberts & Smith). The principles in that decision were further expanded on in the Tax Office Ruling TR 2005/12.

Based on the principles outlined in the Ruling and Roberts & Smith, it is clear that whenever a trust is refinancing any existing loans or UPEs care should be taken to ensure there is the requisite connection to income producing activities; as opposed to, for example, making distributions to beneficiaries.

The key criteria is whether it can be shown that the objective purpose of the trustee in borrowing the funds is to refinance the outstanding amount, however the Tax Office’s position is that each situation will depend on the particular facts of the case.

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** For the trainspotters, the title of today's post is riffed from the Gorillaz song ‘Feel Good Inc’.

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You got the power** to make superannuation an estate asset?

The decision in Stock (as Executor of the Will of Mandie, Deceased) v N.M. Superannuation Proprietary Limited [2015] FCA 612 is another reminder of the fact that superannuation death benefits are not an estate asset.

Broadly the background was as follows:

1. The member died without making any binding nomination for his superannuation benefits, although binding nominations were permissible.
2. The member had made a non-binding nomination to his wife, however she predeceased him.
3. The trust deed for the fund provided that if there was no binding nomination the trustee retained the discretion to pay a death benefit to the member’s -
1. dependants; or
2. legal personal representative (LPR).
4. The trustee of the super fund resolved to pay the death benefit to the member’s dependants, namely 3 adult children, in equal shares.
5. The LPR challenged the distribution on the basis of comments in the member’s will, including the fact that two of the adult children had entered into a settlement agreement with their father 20 years earlier confirming they would have no entitlement under his estate.
6. Under the member’s will, his estate made provision for grandchildren and the child who was not a party to the settlement the other two children had entered into.

In rejecting the LPR’s challenge it was confirmed that superannuation is not an asset of an estate and a trustee is not bound to follow the directions of a will.

In particular, even if superannuation is specifically mentioned in a will, this does not make it an asset subject to the terms of the will. While a trustee may review a deceased member’s will, it is not the role of a super fund trustee to attempt to resolve issues relating to their estate.

Rather, a trustee must independently determine the distribution of a death benefit, unless there is a valid binding death benefit nomination.

It was also confirmed that in making a determination, a super fund trustee need only show that their decision is fair and reasonable. Any court review of a trustee decision therefore did not need to analyse the trustee’s processes or reasoning.

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** For the trainspotters, the title of today's post is riffed from the Gorillaz song ‘We got the power’.

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This is the one** important case on language you need to know this week (the 'income and profits' decision)

Following on from last week’s post, another case that applied some aspects of the reasoning in the decision profiled last week is Wilson & Anor v Chapman & Anor [2012] QSC 395.

Broadly the background was as follows:

1. Under the terms of a will, a beneficiary who was essentially a life tenant of a trust under the will was entitled to the ‘income and profits’ of the assets of the trust;
2. On the basis that the use of the word ‘profits’ must have meant the willmaker wanted the beneficiary to receive more than simply income, the court considered whether both realised and unrealised capital gains fell within the concept;
3. Acknowledging that for tax purposes a realised capital gain is effectively treated as income, the court also held that at least under the terms of the trust in this will, ‘profits’ included the net income and the net realised capital gains, but not unrealised capital gains.

Practically, a key reason why ‘profits’ did not include unrealised capital gains was the fact that it would be impossible to determine at what points to make the calculation and the trustee had no ability to distribute the unrealised gains under the trust instrument. Similarly there was nothing that would allow the trustee to factor in unrealised losses.

Weight was also put on the fact that the will was drafted by a lawyer so the inclusion of the word ‘profits’ must have been due to the willmaker’s intention to provide something more than only income to the life tenant.

More generally the case is a reminder of the need to ensure care is taken in drafting any will, particularly in relation to the interplay between tax and trust law principles.

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** For the trainspotters, the title of today's post is riffed from the Stone Roses song ‘This is the one’.

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Estate Planning and Beneficiary Loan Accounts: Fools gold**

The decision in Clark v Inglis [2010] NSWCA 144 remains a key case in relation to the interplay between beneficiary loan accounts and estate planning.

Broadly the background was as follows:

1. Dr Inglis established a trust in 1982 (Trust) with himself, his four children from his first marriage, his one child from his second marriage and his second wife Helen Margaret Inglis (Helen) as potential beneficiaries;
2. A company named ‘Inglis Research Pty Ltd’ acted as the trustee;
3. The main asset class of the Trust was a listed share portfolio that for many years was generally carried in the accounts of the Trust at cost;
4. Many years after the establishment of the Trust, and a change in the method of preparing the trust accounts, ‘income’, although unrealised, from the increase in value of shares was distributed to various beneficiaries creating (in relation to Dr Inglis) a credit loan account of more than $1 million;
5. Under Dr Inglis’ estate plan his personal wealth was gifted under his will to Helen, while control of the Trust and its assets was given to the children of his first marriage.

Among other issues in contention following the death of Dr Inglis, the children from his first marriage challenged the legitimacy of the steps that created a credit loan to his benefit from the Trust.

The Court held that while the accounting approach was perhaps imprudent, it was permissible under the trust deed and there was nothing under the accounting standards that prevented the arrangements.

In this regard it was noted that the trustee had the specific right under the trust deed to re-categorise income and capital and distribute unrealised income in its discretion.

This meant that there had been no breach of trust by the trustee and the debt owing by the Trust to the estate was enforceable and effectively an at call loan, repayable on demand to Helen.

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** For the trainspotters, the title of today's post is riffed from the Stone Roses song ‘Fools Gold’.

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The powers of an attorney: being under the thumb**

An issue that often arises is the exact extent of the powers an attorney may exercise on behalf of a donor.

One of the leading cases in this area is Taheri v Vitek [2014] NSWCA 209.

In summary the key aspects of the case were as follows:

1. The wife appointed her husband under a power of attorney and granted the husband the standard ability ‘to do on my behalf anything I may lawfully authorise an attorney to do’.
2. The attorney document (as is often the case) also empowered the husband as attorney to act despite any benefit that may pass to him.
3. The husband later used his appointment as attorney to sign on behalf of his wife and guarantee a purchase of land by a company the husband was sole director of.
4. The wife subsequently attempted to avoid her obligations under the guarantee on the basis that the document and wider transaction did not benefit her.

The court held that the wife was bound to comply with the guarantee, regardless of whether the transaction was for her benefit. The decision was primarily based on the term in the appointment document that allowed the husband to act even if the transaction did not benefit his wife.

It was however also confirmed that even if the appointment of attorney document does not specifically confirm an attorney can act against the interests of the donor, the attorney’s actions may still be binding. The reason for this general approach of the courts is to ensure certainty for third parties who reasonably rely on the apparent authority of an attorney.

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** For the trainspotters, the title of today's post is riffed from the Rolling Stones song ‘Under my thumb’.

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Letting little fury things ** like the tax tail wag the dog

Given the theme of ‘famous tax cases’ in recent posts, it seemed appropriate to revisit the tax aspects of the case involving the family of famous retailer Solomon Lew (Lew), in Solomon Lew & Ors v Adam Priester & Ors [2012] VSC 57.

Broadly the situation was as follows:

1. Based on tax advice about an impending tax change (which was ultimately never implemented), certain distributions were made by a trust ultimately controlled by Lew to each of his children
2. The potential change was proposed in the late 1990’s and was known as the ‘profits first rule’ which would have seen a mandatory requirement that any distribution from a trust would presumed to be of profits and therefore taxable.
3. 2 of Lew’s children some years later were caught up in (separate) property settlements following the breakdown of their respective marriages.
4. The former spouses claimed the outstanding loans were assets of Lew’s children and therefore able to be subject to orders of the Family Court.
5. Lew argued that his children did not have any beneficial interest in the loan accounts due to agreements entered which resulted in the amounts in fact being held by the children on a trust for Lew and his wife Rose.

While the exact outcome as to whether the loans were in fact assets of the children appears to be unknown (it is assumed the cases must have settled out of court or the decisions de-identified), the fact that the former spouses were able to mount the arguments is a reminder that the wider commercial implications of any tax planning strategy should always be considered carefully.

Similarly, in the high profile case of Cardaci v Filippo Primo Cardaci as executor of the estate of Marco Antonio Cardaci [No 5] [2021] WASC 331, in a situation where historically payments to a beneficiary were categorised as distributions of capital or income, a subsequent unilateral attempt by the trustee to commence treating the amounts as loans was rejected by the court.

This was ultimately on the basis that the trustee had not adequately or sufficiently explained how or why the change in characterisation occurred, nor was there any express or implied loan agreement in relation to the payments.

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** For the trainspotters, the title of today's post is riffed from the Dinosaur Jnr song ‘Little fury things’.

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Yeah right** - because before Rinehart, there was Murdoch

While the Rinehart decision received significant attention in relation to many issues, including the tax consequences of ending a trust, the tax principles of another famous case are worth remembering, namely the decision in Murdoch v Commissioner of Taxation [2008] FCAFC 86.

Broadly the situation was as follows –

1. Dame Elisabeth Murdoch (Dame) had a life interest in the income of several family trusts settled by her husband in the 1930s.
2. The remainder interest was held by one or more of the Dame’s children or grandchildren.
3. For many years, the trustee of the relevant trusts was effectively the Dame, her son Rupert Murdoch and a third party.
4. It was however noted that the Dame was likely influenced in her role to accept the investment decisions due to the very strong personality of her son Rupert.
5. A Reorganisation Agreement under which Dame surrendered her life interests under each of the Trusts were entered into, with the consideration a lump sum payment of more than $85m.
6. The payment was couched as releasing the trustees from potential claims for breaches of trustee duties.
7. In particular, the investment policy that had been adopted (apparently at Rupert’s strong recommendation) was overwhelming weighted to shares in Murdoch family companies that produced capital growth, but comparatively small dividend income. This investment approach essentially benefited the remainder beneficiaries, at the expense of the Dame as life tenant.
8. The payment was said to be to help avoid the need for litigation amongst the family.
9. Around 65% of the $85m was then gifted by the Dame to Rupert and charities she was associated with.
10. The payment was funded by the sale of pre capital gains tax shares and was essentially received tax free by the Dame.

In confirming the extremely onerous fiduciary duties of a trustee (see the post from last week) the court confirmed that Rupert had breached his obligations, even though there was no lack of good faith or particular damage to the Dame.

The court relied particularly on the principles of the case Phipps v Boardman [1967] 2 AC 26, which held that this style of claim was not for a reimbursement of the income shortfall.

The payment was therefore on capital, not income, account as a claim against the profit made by Rupert and in essence a constructive trust over assets of the trust.

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** For the trainspotters, the title of today's post is riffed from the Dinosaur Jnr song ‘Yeah, right’.

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