To cut a long story short** In conclusion - 1 related issue

Subject to the terms of the relevant trust deed, a change to the appointor or principal provisions should have no adverse revenue consequences. Any change should, even if not expressly required by the deed, be done with the consent of the incumbent appointor. This is because of the significant ultimate powers retained by the appointor.

This conclusion about the extent of an appointor's powers however does not mean that where an appointor or principal is declared bankrupt, their power of appointment is considered 'property' which vests in and can be exercised by the trustee in bankruptcy.

Historically, there has been some confusion around this issue, given that the property of a bankrupt under the Bankruptcy Act which is available for distribution to creditors includes "the capacity to exercise, and to take proceedings for exercising, all such powers in, over or in respect of property as might have been exercised by the bankrupt for his own benefit…".

However, it has been held that the right of a bankrupt to exercise a power of appointment under a discretionary trust is not property of the bankrupt (see Re Burton; ex parte Wily v Burton (1994) 126 ALR 557).

In that case, the argument of the trustee in bankruptcy centred on the fact that Mr Burton was the appointor and a discretionary beneficiary of a family trust. He could in theory therefore appoint himself (or an entity that he controlled) as trustee.

In rejecting the argument, it was held that the powers of an appointor are fiduciary powers that must be exercised accordingly, in the interest of the beneficiaries.

In other words, the powers of an appointor must be exercised solely in furtherance of the purpose for which they were conferred.

This means that the powers of an appointor do not amount to 'property' that passes to a trustee in bankruptcy.

The powers are also not something that can be exercised by the bankrupt for their own benefit.

By analogy, the power to remove an appointor is also considered to be a fiduciary power (see Ash v Ash [2016] VSC 577).

This means that equitable relief may be imposed upon a third party who knowingly receives some benefit from the fiduciary's wrongful conduct or is knowingly involved in that wrongful conduct (see Barnes v Addy (1874) LR 9 Ch App 244).

An attorney may be able to exercise the powers of an appointor, if this is anticipated by the trust deed or attorney document (and indeed, ideally, both documents in a complementary and considered manner).

An attorney may also be able to exercise an appointor's powers where there is informed consent. Such consent must however involve more than inference from an alleged plan of the principal, particularly where that plan is vaguely defined and based on inference itself. That is, there must be clear evidence of the salient details of the transactions affecting the principal's interests being provided to them before their incapacity (again see Ash v Ash [2016] VSC 577).

Like last week, the above post is again based on an article that we originally contributed to the Weekly Tax Bulletin.

As usual, please make contact if you would like access to any of the content mentioned in this post.

** For the trainspotters, the title of today's post is riffed from the Spandau Ballet song ‘Cut a long story short’.

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How many calls must be made?** - Insurance funded buy sell arrangement: 5 key questions

Previous posts have explored various aspects of insurance funded buy sell arrangements

Based on adviser feedback, 5 of the most often asked questions during the planning process for implementing an insurance funded buy sell arrangement – with View’s short form answer – are set out below.

In no particular order, View generally asks for access to the following information before providing recommendations on the optimal way to structure the buy sell legal documentation:

1. the insurance policies for each principal – why: to ensure the agreements align with the ownership structure of the insurance;
2. copies of the most recent financial statements for each business entity (including any notes to the statements) – why: there is a material risk that loan accounts are not properly considered as part of the business succession arrangements. Certainly at a minimum, we would recommend that the legal documents specifically regulate how loans are to be treated on the various triggering events;
3. copies of the trust deeds for each of the trusts involved in the structure – why: many trusts do not permit the entering of buy sell arrangements (due to the rules against fettering of trustee discretion – concept explored in previous View posts);
4. the most recent ASIC statement (showing all shareholders and directors) for each business entity – why: to ensure the documentation is binding there should be an audit of the structure of shareholdings and directorships as against the records of the statutory authority; and
5. any existing legal agreements – why: if the existing documents are appropriate our preference is to leave them as is, as opposed to amending simply to ensure they align with View’s approach.

View’s initial review of the material provided is at no cost or obligation and is so that we can ensure we have a proper understanding of the circumstances before suggesting the best way to progress.

All information provided is only retained with authority and is otherwise treated in strict confidence.

As usual, please contact me if you would like access to any of the content mentioned in this post.

** For the trainspotters, the title of today's post is riffed from the Spandau Ballet song 'Only when you leave’.

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