The principle in relation to the probation on a trustee fettering its discretion is arguably best captured in the decision of Fitzwood Pty Ltd v Unique Goal Pty Ltd (in liquidation) [2001] FCA 1628.
In this case the key concepts concerning fettering were summarised as follows –
‘… a trustee is not entitled to fetter the exercise of a discretionary power (for example a power to sale) in advance: Thacker v Key (1869) LR 8 Eq 408; In re Vestey’s Settlement [1951] Ch D 209.If the trustee makes a resolution to that effect, it will be unenforceable, and if the trustee enters into an agreement to that effect, the agreement will not be enforced (Moore v Clench (1875) 1 Ch D 447), though the trustee may be liable in damages for breach of contract …’
Thus in the case mentioned above of In re Vestey’s Settlement, a binding decision to indefinitely make set annual distributions to a particular beneficiary was held to generally be seen as invalid due to the rule against fettering.
The decision in Lambert and Commissioner of Taxation [2013] AATA 442, another case featured in other View posts, further reinforces the above points.
In this case the court confirmed that a trustee is under a fiduciary duty to exercise its powers and discretions upon real and genuine consideration in accordance with the purposes for which the discretion was conferred.
In particular, as confirmed in Karger v Paul [1984] VR 161, it as an inherent requirement of the exercise of any discretion that it be given real and genuine consideration, or as set out in Partridge v The Equity Trustees Executors and Agency Company Limited [1947] HCA 42, there must be the 'exercise of an active discretion'.
Other examples in this regard include:
- the granting of a call option under a lease for the lessee to buy the property was an invalid fetter on the ability for the trustee to sell the property (see: Re Stephenson's Settled Estates (1906) 6 SR (NSW) 420). This outcome should be contrasted to the conclusion in last week's post, where the trust deed expressly allows a trustee to grant options.
- an attempt by a willmaker to mandate via a letter of wishes about how distributions from a testamentary trust set up under the will should made, was an invalid fetter on the trustee's wide discretionary powers for the trustee under the will (see: Burns v Burns & Anor [2008] QSC 173). Specifically it was confirmed that trustees (and third parties) cannot fetter the future exercise of the trustee’s powers. Any fetter is of no effect. Trustees need to be properly informed of all relevant matters at the time they come to exercise their relevant power.
- as an example in contrast, it has been held that more general statements about the preferred manner of a trustee exercising its discretion - that do not in fact create a binding obligation on the trustee - are not an invalid fetter. Simply because a trustee consistently, and every year for many years in a row, follows an identical approach in determining how to exercise its discretion, this will not automatically mean the trustee has forgone having any real choice (see: Entrust Pension Ltd v Prospect Hospice Ltd [2013] PLR 73, [37]).
As usual, please make contact if you would like access to any of the content mentioned in this post.
** For the trainspotters, the title of today's post is riffed from the U2 song 'I will follow’.
View here: