A drafting lesson: waiting for you in the shadows**

Recently we were reviewed a clause in a trust deed that confirmed the beneficiaries were ‘any and all of the children, grandchildren or great grandchildren of the mother and the father.

The drafting approach is a common one, and can lead to 2 starkly different interpretations, namely either all of the children, grandchildren and great grandchildren of:

1. the relationship between the father and the mother; or
2. each of the father and the mother (i.e. including children from other relationships).

Generally the position adopted by the courts is that where a phrase is capable of more than one correct grammatical interpretation the construction that conforms with current usage should prevail, while also having regard to the circumstances surrounding the establishment of the trust.

One of the leading cases is Boranga v Flintoff (1997) 19 WAR 1.

The case confirms that the primary task of courts is to discern the intention of the settlor from the words of the relevant trust deed, with reference to the position as at time the deed was entered into.

In this case the following facts were considered to be relevant in determining whether step-children would be included as beneficiaries under the phrase 'the children of A and B’:

1. the ages of the stepchildren at the time the trust was established and whether the step- children were dependants of A or B at the time;
2. whether the step-children had any special needs, e.g. a disability;
3. the existence and ages of any children from the relationship of A and B at the settlement date;
4. the ages of A and B at the settlement date and whether it was likely there would be any further children from the relationship of A and B; and
5. the pattern of trust distributions and whether the step-children received distributions from the trust.

Having factored in each of the above issues, it was held that the phrase 'the children and remoter issue of the said A and the said B’ included children of either A or B – in other words stepchildren were included.

As usual, please make contact if you would like access to any of the content mentioned in this post.

** For the trainspotters, the title of today's post is riffed from the Thurston Moore song ‘Smoke of dreams’.

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Can you or can't you (explain)** if you can amend a power to amend

Posts over recent weeks have considered various aspects of the extent of authority created for a trustee by a general power of variation under a trust deed.

Another useful case in this area is the decision in University of Adelaide v Attorney-General (SA) [2018] SASC 82.

Relevantly, the court confirmed that:

1. Where a power of amendment has been included in a trust deed, there must be compliance with any procedural or substantive restrictions on its exercise.
2. As a general principle of construction of trust deeds, a 'trustee cannot utilise its power of amendment of the trust deed to remove restrictions on its power of amendment' (see Retail Employees Superannuation Pty Ltd v Pain [2016] SASC 121).
3. Even in the absence of express restrictions, it would seem implicit that a power of amendment cannot be exercised to amend itself (see a case featured in a number of previous posts, namely Jenkins v Ellett [2007] QSC 154).

Despite the above conclusions, the decision in the case of Re McGowan & Valentini Trusts [2021] VSC 154 (as also featured in other View posts) essentially distinguished the above summary.

This was on the basis that where there is an extremely wide power of amendment in a trust deed it should be read and interpreted according to its natural meaning, notwithstanding what might otherwise be a general principle of construction.

As usual, please make contact if you would like access to any of the content mentioned in this post.

** For the trainspotters, the title of today's post riffed from The Who and the song 'I Can't Explain'.

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Embrace the ceremony** and ‘read the deed’

As highlighted in previous posts, the need to ‘read the deed’ before making any variation to a trust deed is critical – and a case that remains a leading example of the mantra is Jenkins v Ellett [2007] QSC 154.

Broadly the background in this case was as follows:

1. A principal under a trust deed had the ability to remove and appoint the trustee of the trust.
2. The principal purported to relay on a power of variation to remove himself as principal and name a replacement, which effectively changed the schedule to the trust deed that automatically appointed the principal’s legal personal representative (LPR) as his replacement on death.
3. When the LPR of the principal purported to exercise the principal powers following the death of the original principal and was challenged, the Court held that the previous attempted variation was invalid, effectively confirming the LPR’s authority to act as the principal.
4. The attempted variation was held to be invalid because the relevant power in the trust deed was crafted so that it could only be used in relation to the ‘trusts declared’, and in particular did not extend to varying the schedule to the trust deed.

Generally the decision here is cited as authority for a number of principles including:

1. If an attempt is made to made to amend fundamental provisions (such as appointor powers or indeed the amendment power itself), there must be a specific ability to do so under the trust instrument. This said, if the power to vary under a deed is wide, this can allow a trustee to change an appointor without their consent; and without destroying the substratum of the deed (see Cihan v Cihan [2022] NSWSC 538, a case explored in other View posts);
2. conversely, ancillary provisions should be able to be amended so long as there is a robust power of amendment in the trust deed;
3. this said, the trust deed may expressly prohibit certain amendments, thereby effectively ‘hard wiring’ those clauses;
4. furthermore, the exercise of a power of amendment must comply with any restrictions on the exercise of power, for example the need to obtain prior consent from a principal or appointor. The case of Re Cavill Hotels P/L [1998] 1 Qd R 396 (which has featured in previous posts) is also often quoted in this regard);
5. any power of variation should be construed widely and beneficially, such that (as one example), even if there is no specific power to amend or extend a vesting date, a wide power of variation will give this ability (see Nisus Pty Ltd [2022] NSWSC 369);
6. in situations where the purported amendment is not within the powers under the deed (or has the consequence of destroying the ‘substratum’ of the trust) it will be held to be invalid and ineffective; see for example Kearns v Hill (1990) 21 NSWLR 107.

As usual, please make contact if you would like access to any of the content mentioned in this post.

** For the trainspotters, the title of today's post is riffed from the New Order song ‘Ceremony’.

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A room without a door** - Default income provisions for family trusts

Following last week’s post, another issue that arises relatively regularly in relation to family trusts is the trust deed not containing a default provision for the distribution of trust income.

While there are many competing arguments, the preferred position appears to be that the absence of such a clause should not make the trust invalid.

This said, without the inclusion of a default income provision, it will generally be the case that a failure by a trustee to validly distribute income in any particular year will mean that the income is accumulated and the trustee will be taxed.
An earlier post, explains that where the trustee is liable to tax this will generally be at the maximum rate of personal tax – that is including the Medicare levy and similar surcharges and without access to the general 50% CGT discount.

As usual, please make contact if you would like access to any of the content mentioned in this post.

** For the trainspotters, the title of today's post is riffed from the Psychedelic Furs song 'Love my way’.

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Trust deeds and default provisions – (Forever) Now:** who wants to be the test case?

We have received some feedback about the following comment in a recent post, namely:

‘There is also a risk that if there is no valid default or gift over provision, then the assets of the trust pass on a resulting trust to the settlor. This outcome is at best problematic, particularly given that the settlor is often an unrelated third party such as an accountant or lawyer.’ (extracted from an earlier post)

The debate about whether discretionary trusts need provisions that detail how assets will be distributed in the event of a trustee failing to make a decision is longstanding, and arguably unresolved.

For those wishing to avoid being the subject of the next test case to resolve the issue, the conservative view appears to be that the lack of a default provision for capital means the trust may be held to be void. If this is the case, the invalidity will be deemed to be from the date of creation of the trust, however only if the trustee fails to make a determination to distribute all of the capital on or prior to the vesting day.

While it is often possible to amend a trust deed to insert a default provision for capital, this amendment can potentially result in capital gains tax and stamp duty being payable on the gross assets of the trust – generally an unacceptable risk.

Specific advice should always be obtained, however practically the approach adopted is often as follows:

1. continue to use the trust for the assets that it already owns;
2. take all reasonable steps to ensure that the trustee exercises its discretion prior to the vesting day to distribute the capital of the trust to any of the named beneficiaries;
3.  where possible (once the lack of a default provision is identified), ensure that the trust does not acquire any further assets; and
4. if the group wishes to acquire further assets within a trust structure, a new trust should be established ensuring that it has none of the technical deficiencies the problematic trust deed contains.

As usual, please make contact if you would like access to any of the content mentioned in this post.

** For the trainspotters, the title of today's post is riffed from the Cold Chisel song 'Forever Now’.

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Dreamworld?** - Varying a power of variation

Previous posts have considered the issues about varying a trust that has not power to vary.

Previous posts have also looked at various aspects concerning the ability to vary trust instruments.

One iteration that is important to remember relates to attempts to vary problematic power of variation.

In other words, if a trust instrument has a variation power that is considered too narrow to achieve wider objectives, is it possible to use the pre-existing variation power to vary that clause of the trust instrument and create a wider power or variation?

As explained by the mantra ‘read the deed', the answer to this question will often depend on the exact terms of the trust instrument.

Very broadly however, the position appears to be as follows:

1. If there is a restriction on how the variation power may be exercised, it is generally not possible to vary the power to remove that restriction.
2. In other words, a trustee cannot implement steps indirectly to achieve something that is prohibited via direct action.
3. The reason for this conclusion is largely based on the rule that a trustee has an overriding duty to comply with the terms of the trust instrument as articulated on the settlement of the trust.
4. The corollary is also true – i.e. if the power of variation expressly contemplates itself being varied, then the trustee should be able to do so.
5. As is almost always the case with the trust deeds, there are a number of related potential issues that should be considered depending on the factual matrix.
6. For example, if a particular trust instrument prohibits distributions to a certain person, but not to a trust of which that person is a potential beneficiary, would a ‘back to back’ distribution from the initial trust to the second trust and then to the relevant person constitute a breach of trustee duties?
7. There is certainly case law to support an argument that where a trustee takes steps to achieve an ulterior purpose, this can constitute a ‘fraud on the power', which means the arrangements may be held to be void by a court.

As usual, please make contact if you would like access to any of the content mentioned in this post.

** For the trainspotters, the title of today's post is riffed from the Midnight Oil song 'Dreamworld’ – inspired by the Cavill Hotels and Star Hotel mentions last week and the icon line ‘the breakfast Creek Hotel is up for sale’.

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Star Hotel** - When two wrongs make anything but a right

Last week’s post considered one of the leading cases in relation to a failure to follow the specific requirements of a trust instrument when appointing a beneficiary.

In that case, the failure to validly appoint a beneficiary caused significant difficulties due to subsequent purported distributions of income to the party.

In summary, it was held as follows:

1. The attempted distribution of income to an invalidly appointed ‘beneficiary' is a nullity.
2. On this basis, the distribution can be set aside as void ‘ab initio' – in other words, the distribution itself is taken to never have occurred (this aspect of the decision relied on an earlier case of Re Cavill Hotels Pty Ltd [1998] 1 QdR 396.
3. Where a purported distribution of income fails, the entitlement of valid potential beneficiaries will depend on the relevant original distribution minute initially.
4. If the relevant distribution minute does not address who receives a failed distribution, then the default provisions, if any, under the trust instrument will apply.
5. The ability for any default clause under a trust instrument to operate effectively will depend upon whether they do in fact trigger a distribution within the relevant income year. As profiled in an earlier post, some trust deeds do not operate effectively in this regard.
6. There is also a risk that if there is no valid default or gift over provision, then the assets of the trust pass on a resulting trust to the settlor. This outcome is at best problematic, particularly given that the settlor is often an unrelated third party such as an accountant or lawyer.

Practically, a trustee would need to reimburse the trust (or each underpaid beneficiary) to the extent of the invalid distribution from their own assets.

Trustee Exposure also potentially extends to other losses, for example overpaid income tax that may have become unrecoverable from the Tax Office (eg due to being out of time).

While in theory the trustee would be entitled to recover amounts it personally compensates the trust for from the overpaid beneficiary, practically if that beneficiary does not have assets, recovery attempts may fail.

As usual, please make contact if you would like access to any of the content mentioned in this post.

** For the trainspotters, the title of today's post is riffed from the Cold Chisel song 'Star Hotel’ – inspired by the Cavill Hotels case mentioned above.

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A seven nation army**? - How many resolutions does it take to create a valid appointment?

Previous posts have looked at various aspects of trust related strategies recommended by accountant Steve Hart, that over time caught the attention of the Tax Office.

Previous posts have also considered various aspects of the mantra ‘read the deed'.

Recently, I was reminded of a decision, which highlights the importance of both of these concepts, namely the decision in Idlecroft Pty Ltd V Commissioner of Taxation [2004] FCA 1087.

The factual matrix in this matter was relatively complex. Arguably, the key aspect related to a purported nomination of a beneficiary.

The relevant clause in the trust instrument gave the principal of the trust the power to nominate beneficiaries by notice in writing to the trustee.

Under the purported written nomination, the principal did sign the document, however it was noted in the instrument that the signature was in his capacity as a director of the trustee company.

The court held that the document failed to satisfy the requirements under the trust deed for the principal to provide the trustee with written notification of the appointment of beneficiary.

In turn, this meant that the subsequent distributions of income to the beneficiary, who was not in fact validly appointed, failed.

Next week’s post will summarise some of the consequences of this failure.

As usual, please make contact if you would like access to any of the content mentioned in this post.

** For the trainspotters, the title of today's post is riffed from the White Stripes song '7 Nation Army’.

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Trust deed without a power to vary: you'd better run, run, run** to court

Posts over recent weeks have considered the issues about varying a trust that has no, or an inadequate, power to vary.

An iteration on the theme is set out in the decision of Budumu Pty Ltd [2021] NSWSC 522.

In this case a power to vary was granted under the trust instrument, however it was only able to be relied on during the life time of 2 named (primary) beneficiaries; both of whom had died by the time the variation was required.

Court approval was therefore needed, and granted, in order to ensure the trust avoided the land tax surcharge in relation to foreign beneficiaries.

A further example is provided in the decision of Casibond Pty Ltd: In the matter of George Tsivis Family Trust [2021] NSWSC 320. In this case, a trust deed had no formal power of variation, however did have the following provision:

'(The Trustee may) generally, determine all matters as to which any doubt, difficulty or question arises in relation to the Trust Fund and every such determination shall bind all parties interested in the Trust, but nothing in this sub-clause shall prevent the Trustee or any person interested in the Trust Fund from applying to the Court.'

This provision was held to be insufficient to allow the trustee to avoid the application of the foreign beneficiary surcharge, however again the court approved steps allowing the desired outcome.

As usual, please make contact if you would like access to any of the content mentioned in this post.

** For the trainspotters, the title of today's post is riffed from the Hunters and Collectors song 'Run, Run, Run'.

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Little room** (to move) - Varying a power of variation

Posts over the last couple of weeks have considered the issues about varying a trust that has not power to vary.

Previous posts have also looked at various aspects concerning the ability to vary trust instruments.

One iteration that is important to remember relates to attempts to vary problematic power of variation.

In other words, if a trust instrument has a variation power that is considered too narrow to achieve wider objectives, is it possible to use the pre-existing variation power to vary that clause of the trust instrument and create a wider power or variation?

As explained by the mantra ‘read the deed', the answer to this question will often depend on the exact terms of the trust instrument.

Very broadly however, the position appears to be as follows:

1. If there is a restriction on how the variation power may be exercised, it is generally not possible to vary the power to remove that restriction.
2. In other words, a trustee cannot implement steps indirectly to achieve something that is prohibited via direct action.
3. The reason for this conclusion is largely based on the rule that a trustee has an overriding duty to comply with the terms of the trust instrument as articulated on the settlement of the trust.
4. The corollary is also true – i.e. if the power of variation expressly contemplates itself being varied, then the trustee should be able to do so.
5. As is almost always the case with the trust deeds, there are a number of related potential issues that should be considered depending on the factual matrix.
6. For example, if a particular trust instrument prohibits distributions to a certain person, but not to a trust of which that person is a potential beneficiary, would a ‘back to back’ distribution from the initial trust to the second trust and then to the relevant person constitute a breach of trustee duties?
7. There is certainly case law to support an argument that where a trustee takes steps to achieve an ulterior purpose, this can constitute a ‘fraud on the power', which means the arrangements may be held to be void by a court.

As usual, please make contact if you would like access to any of the content mentioned in this post.

** For the trainspotters, the title of today's post is riffed from the White Stripes song 'Little Room’.

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When tax savings inspire courts to decide: Let's Groove** with a proposed trust variation

Posts over recent weeks have considered various issues about courts varying a trust deed that has no sufficient power of variation.

One of the cases mentioned was the decision in Cecil Investments Pty limited [2021] NSWSC 211.

This decision (as well as TNB 878 Pty Limited – Brunskill Family Trust [2022] NSWSC 527) is also useful as it confirms that there have been a number of cases where it is has been held tax savings or advantages form a basis of expediency in the management and administration of trust property - one of the key tests that generally need to be satisfied.

In particular the decision lists the following examples:

1. Re A.S. Skyes and the Trustee Act (1974) 1 NSWLR 597: “… the powers conferred on the Court should not be withheld merely because their exercise is sought to enable the avoidance of a revenue impost…”
2. Stein v Sybmore Holdings Pty Ltd [2006] NSWSC 1004: “As well, the minimisation of the capital gains tax and stamp duty on the trust property provides a separate basis upon which the conferring of the power is expedient.”
3. Application of NSFT Pty Ltd [2010] NSWSC 380: “modernisation of the trust deed ... with consequential tax benefits, is expedient in the management or administration of the property vested in the trustee…”
4. Barry v Borlas Pty Ltd [2012] NSWSC 831: the scope of the court's powers includes preserving trust property and making it financially productive “…which included planning to minimise the impact of tax and duty on the trust property…”
5. Soo v Soo [2016] NSWSC 1666: "… there are numerous decisions of this Court to the effect that the tax effective administration of a trust is a matter to which regard may properly be had in considering whether or not to exercise discretion".

The above summary largely reflects the conclusions in Kearns v Hill (1990) 21 NSWLR 107, another case featured in other View posts.

As usual, please make contact if you would like access to any of the content mentioned in this post.

** For the trainspotters, the title of today's post is riffed from the Earth, Wind and Fire song 'Let's Groove’.

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When you dream** of a better trust deed; however the court refuses to assist

Last week's post considered the issues about varying a trust that has no power to vary, under the regime in New South Wales.

While in other states, for example Queensland, it is generally accepted there is a relatively wide power available to the courts to assist with amending trust deeds that do not have robust provisions, the rules in New South Wales are far more restrictive.

One further example in this regard is the decision in Application of Country Road Services Pty Ltd (In the matter of the Browne Family Trust) [2019] NSWSC 779.

In this case a desired amendment to a trust deed to appoint a related trust (that had losses) to allow distributions to it was rejected as not being 'expedient' (as required by the legislation in New South Wales).

The court confirmed that:

1. The variation of the terms of a trust (including by way of conferral of some new power on the trustee) is not something within the ordinary and natural province of a trustee’s powers (unless the trust deed otherwise grants the relevant power).
2. It is neither something that is ‘expedient’ that a trustee should do nor, fundamentally, something that is done ‘in management or administration of’ trust property.
3. Rather, a trustee’s function is to take the trusts as it finds them and to administer them as they stand.
4. A trustee should not be concerned to question the terms of the trust or seek to improve them.
5. Thus, even where the trust instrument itself gives the trustee a power of variation, exercise of that power is not something that occurs “in the management or administration of” trust property. It occurs in order that the scheme of fiduciary administration of the property may somehow be reshaped.
6. Ultimately, the Court’s power to amend a trust deed in New South Wales cannot be used to subvert the beneficial disposition in the trust instrument.

Similarly therefore, a request to amend a trust deed to extend the perpetuity period was held to be another example of the kind of order not authorised by legislation in New South Wales (see Cisera v Cisera Holdings Pty Ltd [2018] NSWCA 286), even though the trust was due to vest in around 7 years and would likely trigger significant capital gains tax costs at that point.

As usual, please make contact if you would like access to any of the content mentioned in this post.

** For the trainspotters, the title of today's post is riffed from the Simple Minds song ‘New Gold Dream’.

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Salvation!** - Varying a trust deed when there is no power of variation

Pursuant to the Trusts Acts (and similar legislation) in most Australian states, there is an inherent power for a court to make variations to trust instruments.

This power can be extremely important where there is no, or a very narrow, power of variation in a trust instrument.

One of the leading cases in this area is Re Dion Investments Pty Ltd [2013] NSWSC 1941.

In broad terms, the case involved a trust deed setup in 1973, which the trustee was wanting to amend so as to be able to better manage the trust property. The relevant legislative provision in New South Wales gave the court the power to amend a trust instrument so long as it was ‘expedient' for the management or administration of trust property.

In rejecting a request to amend the deed by inserting a comprehensive variation power (which in turn would have allowed the trustee to make such changes to the trust deed as it deemed appropriate from time to time), the court confirmed:

1. The legislative provisions did not allow the court to simply insert into the deed a comprehensive power of variation.
2. Only specific powers (in contrast to wide discretionary powers) with respect to a particular dealing will be granted under the legislation.
3. It was however permissible for the court to confer particular and limited powers in relation to certain issues such as how to account for income and capital gains and related tax driven provisions.
4. Despite not originally crafting its variation request along the lines that the court said was permissible, the trustee was permitted to make further submissions in accordance with the court’s recommendations for immediate approval.

Interestingly, in the subsequent decision of Re Dion Investments Pty Limited [2020] NSWSC 1661, the court authorised a further variation to ensure the ‘foreign person’ land tax surcharge could be avoided. This was in light of the fact that the trust deed did not give the trustee the ability to exclude foreign persons as beneficiaries. In particular, the relevant power of variation was limited to 'trusts' (granted to persons who had all died and therefore had lapsed), not the ‘powers’ – a distinction explored in many previous View posts.

The court confirmed that the requirements in the legislation were all met, namely:

1. There needs to be a 'proposed dealing', being a 'sale, lease, mortgage, surrender, release, or disposition, or any purchase, investment, acquisition, expenditure, or transaction'.
2. The dealing must be in the Court’s opinion 'expedient'.
3. The dealing must be incapable of being effected because of an absence of power.

Relevantly the court confirmed that the existence of a tax advantage can form the basis of the ‘expediency’ in the management and administration of trust property requirement; here the land tax saving was over $100,000. This conclusion was reached notwithstanding that the order would adjust or even destroy the rights of some (potential) beneficiaries to the extent that they met the definition of a 'foreign person'.

The same outcome was granted in the case of Cecil Investments Pty limited [2021] NSWSC 211, where the trust deed permitted only a variation to the 'powers' not 'trusts.

This case also confirmed that previous attempted variations to the trust deed were invalid as they breached the limitation set out in the power of variation against anything that purported to change beneficiaries who were takers-in-default of appointment.

As has been explained in numerous previous posts, a comprehensive power of variation is arguably one of the most important aspects of any trust deed.

It is important to keep in mind that the legislation is worded differently in each State, for example the Queensland Courts have a wider power than in NSW. Reference should therefore always be had to the specific wording of the legislation in the relevant jurisdiction.

As usual, please make contact if you would like access to any of the content mentioned in this post.

** For the trainspotters, the title of today's post is riffed from the Black Rebel Motor Cycle club song 'Salvation’.

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NSW implications for all changes of trustee

With thanks to the Television Education Network, today’s post considers the above mentioned topic in a vidcast.

As usual, an edited transcript of the presentation is below:

There is a specific provision of the New South Wales Duties Act which requires that, in order to qualify for the stamp duty exemption where a change of trustee is occurring, the new trustee needs to be excluded as a beneficiary of the trust.

This means the trust deed needs to contain an express provision excluding any new trustee from being a beneficiary.

Advisers practicing in New South Wales are usually acutely aware of that limitation being in most of their trust deeds and of the resulting need to look at who may have been a previous trustee to see whether any beneficiaries are excluded.

The issue comes up quite commonly because several of the popular online trust deed providers use trust deeds from Sydney law firms, meaning that even though the trust deed might be ordered online by an accountant in Western Australia or a lawyer in South Australia, if the deed provider is based in New South Wales, the deed they’re providing probably contains this exclusion without the adviser being aware of it.

There are two reasons we need to know whether the deed contains the exclusion.

Firstly, if we are changing the trustee and we appoint a new trustee who is a beneficiary of the trust, then that change of trustee may be invalid or it may trigger unintended tax or stamp duty consequences.

Secondly, we may have individuals who were previously a trustee of the trust and who at face value appear to be a beneficiaries, but who were actually excluded as a result of the clause.

For instance, if Mum and Dad were individual trustees but they subsequently retired and appointed a corporate trustee, even though they may be named as beneficiaries of the trust, the exclusion clause may have made them ineligible to receive income or capital distributions.

An exclusion like this can have an impact from a family law perspective and also from a tax perspective, if we have been purporting to make trust distributions to individuals thinking they were beneficiaries, not being aware of this exclusion hidden within the trust deed.

Brown M&Ms, invasion by aliens and when trust beneficiaries aren’t beneficiaries

In preparing for the upcoming View webinar ‘Trust Horror Stories’ (see details below) we had a timely reminder of the mantra to ‘read the deed’.

The read the deed mantra is analogous to the famous contract rider of rock band Van Halen requiring M&Ms in their dressing room; with all the brown ones removed.

Originally thought to be the very definition of an outlandish group of prima donnas, the truth was all about the detail – if Van Halen ever saw brown M&Ms on arrival at a venue they were on notice that the venue operator did not sweat the detail.

On more than one occasion they used the existence of a brown M&M as cause for cancelling a gig; or perhaps more bluntly, telling the venue to go ‘Jump’**.

Contract lawyers have long been renowned for a similar technique when crafting ‘force majeure’ provisions and randomly including events such as inability to complete a contract due to invasion by aliens or abduction by unicorns to flush out those who are not checking every line.

In the trust deed example we had this week, a trustee company had been distributing income from a trust to itself as a corporate beneficiary (ie to cap the tax rate at 30%).

Aside from the asset protection issues that can arise from using a corporate trustee as a corporate beneficiary, the other main issue to consider was whether the company could in fact be a beneficiary of the trust – in other words did the deed include the trustee as a beneficiary.

As is quite often the case with trusts established in New South Wales (in particular), in this instance, the trustee was in fact expressly excluded as a potential beneficiary of the trust. See the following post for a more detailed analysis of this aspect of many trust deeds –

Read the deed - another reminder re invalid distributions.

The invalid distribution, which unfortunately had been made over a number of years, meant that a range of quite complex issues arose in relation to the trust, with a multitude of tax, trust law and accounting issues needing to be addressed. The solutions available for each issue were, at best, problematic.

As mentioned, our upcoming webinar ‘Trust Horror Stories’ will have many case study examples highlighting key issues to be aware of with managing trusts.


Find out more here - https://viewlegal.com.au/product/webinar-trust-horror-stories/

Watch the promo video below.

** for the trainspotters, one of Van Halen’s most popular songs is ‘Jump’ – see - https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=k8LdRJqjjRM and there is a prize for anyone who can confirm the list of contract riders for hair product.

Another reminder to ‘read the deed’

As highlighted in last week’s post, the need to ‘read the deed’ before making any variation to a trust deed is critical (see for example http://blog.viewlegal.com.au/2015/09/always-read-deed.html).

The case (Jenkins v Ellett [2007] QSC 154) mentioned in passing, in a previous post (see - http://blog.viewlegal.com.au/2010/09/when-power-to-vary-is-not-power-to-vary.html) and again last week, remains a leading example of this mantra.

As usual, a full copy of the decision is available via the following link - http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/qld/QSC/2007/154.html

Broadly the situation in this case was as follows:

A principal under a trust deed had the ability to remove and appoint the trustee of the trust.

The principal purported to rely on a power of variation to remove himself as principal and name a replacement, which effectively changed the schedule to the trust deed that automatically appointed the principal’s legal personal representative (LPR) as his replacement on death.

When the LPR of the principal purported to exercise the principal powers following the death of the original principal and was challenged, the Court held that the previous attempted variation was invalid, effectively confirming the LPR’s authority to act as the principal.

The attempted variation was held to be invalid because the relevant power in the trust deed was crafted so that it could only be used in relation to the ‘trusts declared’, and in particular did not extend to varying the schedule to the trust deed.

Until next week. 


Image credit: Jenni C cc

Always ‘read the deed’

The recent decision of Mercanti v. Mercanti [2015] WASC 297 again reinforces the mantra ‘read the deed’, which is a theme that has featured regularly in previous posts (see for example - http://blog.viewlegal.com.au/2014/03/death-benefit-nominations-read-deed.html, http://blog.viewlegal.com.au/2013/08/a-further-reminder-read-deed.html, http://blog.viewlegal.com.au/2012/07/ato-reminder-read-deed.html).

As usual, a full copy of the decision is available via the following link – http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/wa/WASC/2015/297.html

Broadly the background was as follows –

1. As part of a family succession plan, two family discretionary trusts were amended by deleting the original definition of ‘appointor’ for each trust.
2. This resulted in the father being replaced by his son as appointor of the two trusts.
3. The appointor power under each trust gave the person nominated the power to unilaterally change the trustee of each trust.
4. A later family dispute saw the son purport to exercise the appointor powers under each trust deed (as amended) to replace the trustees with a company he controlled.
5. The father attempted to resist the changes, in part on the basis that the earlier deeds of variation were not in accordance with the variation power in the trust deeds and therefore invalid.

In deciding that the change of appointor was valid under one trust deed, and invalid under the other, the court highlighted the overriding importance of reading the relevant trust instrument.  In particular –

(a)    One deed had a variation power that relevantly provided the ability to ‘vary all or any of the trusts, terms and conditions’. The scope of this provision was sufficiently wide to allow the original change of appointor and therefore the son was able to use his power to change the trustee.

(b)   The power under the second deed however only provided the ability to ‘vary all or any of the trusts’.  In other words, there was no express power to amend the terms and conditions of the trust deed.

(c)    The concept of ‘trusts’ does not ordinarily, and did not here, extend to the appointor clauses, meaning the purported variation of appointor was invalid and in turn the son’s attempted change of trusteeship ineffective.

In many respects the decision here is simply the application of principles explained in detail in the case of Jenkins v Ellett [2007] QSC 154, which will be the subject of next week’s post.

Until next week.

Image credit: Anders Bachmann cc

Extensions to vesting dates – some lessons from Re Arthur Brady Family Trust; Re Trekmore Trading Trust

For those that do not otherwise have access to the Weekly Tax Bulletin, the most recently published article by fellow View Legal Director Patrick Ellwood and I is extracted below.

Often a key reason for seeking to extend the vesting day of a trust will be to defer the likely tax and stamp duty implications that would arise where the trust vests and assets are distributed to the beneficiaries.

The recent Queensland case of Re Arthur Brady Family Trust; Re Trekmore Trading Trust [2014] QSC 244 (see 2014 WTB 42 [1416]), provides a useful illustration of the way in which the Courts respond to applications where deferring revenue costs are arguably the primary driver for the application.

The case follows previous decisions such as Stein v Sybmore Holdings Pty Ltd [2006] NSWSC 1004 in NSW and Re Plator Nominees Pty Ltd [2012] VSC 284 in Victoria, each of which are discussed below.

Legislation

In each State, the Court has statutory power to vary trust instruments in particular circumstances.
In the Northern Territory, this power can be exercised where the Court “thinks fit”.

In Western Australia and Queensland, the power can be exercised where the Court considers the variation “expedient” or where the transaction is in “the best interests of the beneficiaries”.
In all other jurisdictions, the “expedient” test applies.

In circumstances where a trust has been established with a vesting period of less than 80 years, the trustee may vary the trust deed, in accordance with an express power of variation in the trust instrument, to extend the vesting day.

The decision of FCT v Clark [2011] FCAFC 5 provides comfort that in many circumstances, such a variation will not trigger a resettlement of the trust for tax purposes.

However where the trust instrument does not provide the trustee with adequate powers to extend the vesting day, an application to the Court may be necessary.

The Court would therefore need to consider whether the trustee’s reasons for wanting to extend the vesting day are “expedient” or “in the best interests of the beneficiaries”, depending on the jurisdiction.

Cases

Stein v Sybmore Holdings Pty Ltd involved an application under s 81 of the Trustee Act 1925 (NSW) to extend the vesting day of a trust established in 1978, which was to vest in 2007.

The trustee sought an order authorising it to extend the vesting date of the trust, notwithstanding that the variation power in the trust instrument was insufficient to allow such an amendment.

The trustee’s reasons for seeking the authorisation included:

1. the trust had been established for the intended benefit of the applicant’s children and grandchildren, however his adult children were unmarried and without children and unless the application was granted, the trust would vest before his grandchildren could benefit; and

2. the trustee anticipated that capital gains tax of $690,000 and stamp duty of $620,000 would be payable on vesting of the trust, diluting an asset pool valued at approximately $13m.

The Court granted the order requested as it considered the amendment to be “expedient”.  The judgment focused primarily on the first reason for the application outlined above, however the dilution to the value of the trust that would have been caused by the capital gains tax and stamp duty costs outlined above were a relevant factor.

A similar sentiment can be found in the Victorian case of Plator Nominees Pty Ltd.  The case involved a trust established in 1972 which had a 40 year vesting period.  Consequently the trust was due to vest in 2012.

The trustee brought an application under s 63A of the Trustee Act 1958 (Vic) that the vesting day be extended to the date 21 years after the death of the last living relative of one of the primary beneficiaries.

The trustee’s application included the following justifications for the extension:

1. the trust was established as a property investment vehicle intended to survive the primary beneficiaries for the benefit of their children, but if it vested in 2012 it would not achieve that purpose;

2. all of the beneficiaries had consented to the extension;

3. no specific reason could be identified as to why 2012 had been nominated as the vesting day; and

4. if the trust vested in 2012 a “significant capital gain” would be realised.

The Court granted the extension and noted that, consistent with previous judicial authority, the fact that deferral of taxation costs was one of the drivers for requesting the extension did not preclude it from granting the extension.

Re Arthur Brady Family Trust; Re Trekmore Trading Trust arguably further clarifies the position set out in the previous cases.

In that case, the first trust was established in 1977 with a vesting date of 2017.  The second trust was established in 2008 with near identical terms to the first trust (presumably as part of a trust ‘cloning’ arrangement), including the 2017 vesting date.

The applicants sought an order for an extension to the vesting date under (at the time) section 96 of the Trusts Act 1973 (Qld) (which under the Trusts Act 2025 (Qld) would be under section 183).

The sole reason for the application outlined in the judgment was the applicant’s desire to defer capital gains tax and stamp duty costs which would substantially dilute the overall pool of assets to the detriment of the beneficiaries.

The total tax and stamp duty costs across both trusts were anticipated to exceed $1.8m out of an asset pool of $15m.

The applicant submitted that, in order to maintain the property portfolios, the beneficiaries would need to borrow funds to meet the transaction costs.  Each of the contingent beneficiaries supported the application.

After a detailed analysis, the Court granted the requested extensions as it was satisfied the “very substantial impact of taxes and duties upon the trust funds” and the unanimous approval of the beneficiaries supported the exercise of its discretion.

Lessons

A few key lessons can be taken from the cases above.

First, many trust deeds from all eras, and particularly those established in the 1970s and 1980s include vesting periods significantly shorter than 80 years.

Practitioners should be alert to this issue and ensure they methodically check the vesting day of every trust as part of any trust dealing.

Secondly, Re Arthur Brady Family Trust; Re Trekmore Trading Trust provides authority that the Court may grant an order for the extension of a vesting day even where the sole purpose of the extension is to defer the capital gains tax costs and stamp duty costs that would otherwise arise as a result of the vesting, provided it can be shown that those costs would have a material adverse impact on the beneficiaries.

Finally, although any application to Court carries a degree of risk, recent cases indicate the Court will generally react positively to applications for the extension of vesting dates, where there are compelling commercial or family reasons to order the extension.


Until next week.

Some ramifications of failed trust distributions

For those that do not otherwise have access to the Weekly Tax Bulletin, the most recent published article by fellow View Legal Director Tara Lucke and I is extracted below.

As regularly addressed in the Weekly Tax Bulletin, a methodical approach is needed when preparing trust distribution resolutions to ensure the intended outcomes are achieved.

As explored at 2014 WTB 27 [942], there are a range of issues often overlooked in relation to distribution resolutions.

Where a purported trust distribution is subsequently found to be invalid, several potential ramifications arise, including:

• The "knowing recipient" principle.
• Disallowed deductions.
• Disclaimers.
• Equity and rectification.
• Impact of any default provisions.

Further comments on each of these issues are set out in turn below.

"Knowing recipient" principle

"Knowing recipient" is a principle that evolved out of situations where a trustee (who holds property on trust on behalf of the beneficiaries of a trust) appropriates trust funds for the benefit of a third party who has knowledge of the trust relationship. 

The concept gives the "wronged" beneficiaries the right to make a personal claim against the third party on the basis that the third party received the trust property, whilst having knowledge of the relationship between the property in question, the trustee and the beneficiaries. 

Impact of disallowed deductions

The treatment of disallowed deductions turns largely on the way in which the relevant distribution resolution is crafted. 

Broadly, there are 3 possible outcomes, namely:

• the amounts representing the disallowed deductions will be validly distributed to a particular beneficiary via the provisions of a distribution resolution;
• the default provisions under the trust deed will regulate the distribution (further comments in this regard are set out below); or
• the amount will be treated as an accumulation to the trust and the trustee will be taxed at the highest marginal tax rate is applied.

Disclaimers

In FCT v Ramsden [2005] FCAFC 39, the court held that the purported disclaimers by particular beneficiaries were ineffective.  However, it was confirmed that any interest acquired in the net income of a trust under the default provisions of a deed could be disclaimed by a beneficiary separately from any other entitlements which might accrue to that beneficiary under other provisions of the deed.

It was also confirmed that a disclaimer can be made retrospectively, provided it is made within a reasonable period of time from the beneficiary first becoming aware of the relevant interest that they wish to disclaim.

Equity and rectification

A court may use the equitable remedy of rectification where there is an error in a trust document which does not reflect the intentions of the parties and in turn, results in an invalid distribution. 

In order for rectification to be granted, the party applying for the court to exercise its discretion must establish 3 elements:

• the intention that the parties had in relation to the document up until the time the distribution resolution was executed
• a mistake was made in the document that does not reflect the parties' true intentions; an
• if the rectification order was granted, it would correct the mistake and match the parties' intentions.

Importantly, rectification will not be granted where there is simply an inadvertent financial result that occurred due to a misunderstanding of the consequences of a deliberate act.

Default provisions

From a trust law perspective, default capital provisions, and in some cases, default income provisions, under discretionary trusts are generally seen as important to ensure that the trust is valid at law.

From a tax perspective, the main objective of a default distribution clause, particularly for income, is to ensure that the default beneficiaries are assessed on the failed distribution, rather than the trustee being assessed at the top marginal rate.

The case of BRK (BRIS) PTY LTD v FCT (2001) 46 ATR 347 is arguably the leading example in this regard.  In this case, the default distribution clause of the relevant trust required, where there was a failure to distribute, that the trustee "divide the Fund equally among the beneficiaries named in the Schedule hereto". 

However, the clause was crafted such that the distribution did not take place until a date after the end of a tax year. 

Based on the drafting of the relevant clause, the court confirmed that while the provisions were valid from a trust law perspective, the trustee was unable to make the required distribution to the default beneficiaries until after the end of each tax year.  This, in turn meant that all undistributed income was in fact effectively accumulated for tax purposes each tax year. Therefore, all undistributed income was taxed to the trustee at the top marginal rate.

Conclusion – start by reading the deed

Given the range of significantly adverse consequences that can result where a purported trust distribution is subsequently found to be invalid, advisers should proactively invest in processes and systems to minimise the risk of such an outcome.

Invariably, best practice dictates that in every situation before preparing a resolution there should be:

1. a comprehensive review of the relevant trust deed including an analysis of every variation or resolution of a trustee or other person (such as a principal, appointor or guardian) that may impact on the interpretation of the trust document;


2.  specific review of the relevant tax legislation applicable to the amounts to be addressed by the resolution; and


3. thought applied to the exact factual scenario that the trustee is addressing, in the context of the trust deed and tax laws.

Until next week.

Super deed variations and resettlements

Confused about super deed variations?

Last week we had an adviser, probably quite rightly, question us as to why a superannuation trust deed could be totally revoked and replaced with a completely new document, while changes to a family trust deed tend to be extremely piecemeal.

The issue can be largely answered by reference to the Tax Office’s approach to resettlements.

Broadly, the Tax Office accepts that in relation to superannuation funds, a resettlement for tax purposes will never occur. Due to this approach (and stamp duty exemptions that apply in essentially every Australian state), most advisers recommend that when updating a superannuation trust deed, it is best to adopt a completely new deed.

In contrast, where updating a family trust deed, because of the risks associated from a resettlement perspective, it is usually best to only amend the provisions that are in particular need of being addressed.

Until next week.

Image Credit: sidibousaid cc