Can you or can't you (explain)** if you can amend a power to amend

Posts over recent weeks have considered various aspects of the extent of authority created for a trustee by a general power of variation under a trust deed.

Another useful case in this area is the decision in University of Adelaide v Attorney-General (SA) [2018] SASC 82.

Relevantly, the court confirmed that:

1. Where a power of amendment has been included in a trust deed, there must be compliance with any procedural or substantive restrictions on its exercise.
2. As a general principle of construction of trust deeds, a 'trustee cannot utilise its power of amendment of the trust deed to remove restrictions on its power of amendment' (see Retail Employees Superannuation Pty Ltd v Pain [2016] SASC 121).
3. Even in the absence of express restrictions, it would seem implicit that a power of amendment cannot be exercised to amend itself (see a case featured in a number of previous posts, namely Jenkins v Ellett [2007] QSC 154).

Despite the above conclusions, the decision in the case of Re McGowan & Valentini Trusts [2021] VSC 154 (as also featured in other View posts) essentially distinguished the above summary.

This was on the basis that where there is an extremely wide power of amendment in a trust deed it should be read and interpreted according to its natural meaning, notwithstanding what might otherwise be a general principle of construction.

As usual, please make contact if you would like access to any of the content mentioned in this post.

** For the trainspotters, the title of today's post riffed from The Who and the song 'I Can't Explain'.

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Coming home** by extending trust vesting dates

As mentioned in last week’s post, the need to ‘read the deed’ is critical on a number of levels, particularly in relation to the vesting date of a trust.

A previous post also explores when a court may approve the extending of a vesting date for a trust.

The two other main pathways that may assist in this regard are:

1. using a specific power in the trust deed that allows the vesting date to be extended; and
2. using the variation power (if it is broad enough).

Whether a general power of variation will be broad enough was considered in the case of Andtrust v Andreatta [2015] NSWSC 38.

Essentially the decision confirms that where a trust deed contains a power to vary the trust, it should be assumed that the power includes the ability to extend the vesting period, subject to the perpetuity period rules.

In particular, it was held:

‘It does not seem to me to be stretching language unduly to say that a trust to distribute or hold income up until a defined date, and upon that date to distribute capital, is “varied” if that defined date is extended. Thus, as a matter of language, it seems to me that the power to vary the trusts set out in the deed should be taken to include a power to vary them by extending the time for which they are to endure.’

In other words, as explored in other View posts, any variation power should generally be construed widely and beneficially, including in relation to the ability to extend a vesting date even if there is no specific power to do so (see cases such as Kearns v Hill (1990) 21 NSWLR 107 and Nisus Pty Ltd [2022] NSWSC 369).

However, where there is not a sufficiently wide power to vary a trust in relation to the vesting date (or indeed no power to vary at all), the conservative view is that court approval is required.

This said, as explored in other View posts, variation of the terms of a trust may be able to be achieved with the unanimous consent of the beneficiaries if all are in being, sui juris and absolutely entitled (see the rule in Saunders v Vautier (1841) 4 Beav 115). In this style of situation it may also be prudent to have the settlor be a party to the variation deed, if they are alive and have capacity.

As usual, please make contact if you would like access to any of the content mentioned in this post.

** For the trainspotters, the title of today's post is riffed from the Fine Young Cannibals song ‘Johnny come home’.

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Embrace the ceremony** and ‘read the deed’

As highlighted in previous posts, the need to ‘read the deed’ before making any variation to a trust deed is critical – and a case that remains a leading example of the mantra is Jenkins v Ellett [2007] QSC 154.

Broadly the background in this case was as follows:

1. A principal under a trust deed had the ability to remove and appoint the trustee of the trust.
2. The principal purported to relay on a power of variation to remove himself as principal and name a replacement, which effectively changed the schedule to the trust deed that automatically appointed the principal’s legal personal representative (LPR) as his replacement on death.
3. When the LPR of the principal purported to exercise the principal powers following the death of the original principal and was challenged, the Court held that the previous attempted variation was invalid, effectively confirming the LPR’s authority to act as the principal.
4. The attempted variation was held to be invalid because the relevant power in the trust deed was crafted so that it could only be used in relation to the ‘trusts declared’, and in particular did not extend to varying the schedule to the trust deed.

Generally the decision here is cited as authority for a number of principles including:

1. If an attempt is made to made to amend fundamental provisions (such as appointor powers or indeed the amendment power itself), there must be a specific ability to do so under the trust instrument. This said, if the power to vary under a deed is wide, this can allow a trustee to change an appointor without their consent; and without destroying the substratum of the deed (see Cihan v Cihan [2022] NSWSC 538, a case explored in other View posts);
2. conversely, ancillary provisions should be able to be amended so long as there is a robust power of amendment in the trust deed;
3. this said, the trust deed may expressly prohibit certain amendments, thereby effectively ‘hard wiring’ those clauses;
4. furthermore, the exercise of a power of amendment must comply with any restrictions on the exercise of power, for example the need to obtain prior consent from a principal or appointor. The case of Re Cavill Hotels P/L [1998] 1 Qd R 396 (which has featured in previous posts) is also often quoted in this regard);
5. any power of variation should be construed widely and beneficially, such that (as one example), even if there is no specific power to amend or extend a vesting date, a wide power of variation will give this ability (see Nisus Pty Ltd [2022] NSWSC 369);
6. in situations where the purported amendment is not within the powers under the deed (or has the consequence of destroying the ‘substratum’ of the trust) it will be held to be invalid and ineffective; see for example Kearns v Hill (1990) 21 NSWLR 107.

As usual, please make contact if you would like access to any of the content mentioned in this post.

** For the trainspotters, the title of today's post is riffed from the New Order song ‘Ceremony’.

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SMSFs and non-arm’s length income: right here; right now**

One issue to remember with SMSFs is that any income derived by an SMSF as a beneficiary of a trust can be subject to penalty tax.

In particular, income earned other than through holding a fixed entitlement, is non-arm’s length income, and will be taxed according to the non-arm’s length income provisions of the Tax Act at a flat rate of 47%.

Income derived by a superannuation fund as a beneficiary of a fixed trust will also be non-arm’s length income if:

1. the fund acquired the entitlement under a scheme, or the income was derived under a scheme, the parties to which were not dealing with each other at arm’s length; and
2. the amount of the income is more than the amount that the fund might have been expected to derive if those parties had been dealing at arm’s length.

To avoid the impact of the non-arm’s length income rules, it is therefore vital for SMSFs to ensure that:

1. no distributions are made to a SMSF from a discretionary trust; and
2. where a SMSF owns units in a unit trust, the unit trust is a fixed trust for tax purposes.

From a planning perspective, given the Medicare and other surcharges, there may in fact be a saving on overall tax payable by triggering the non-arm’s length income rules by (for example) distributing from a family trust to a SMSF and capping the tax rate at 47%.

It is also relevant to note that the non-arm’s length income rules may apply where a SMSF allows its fixed entitlement to remain as an unpaid present entitlement, as this generally does not reflect an arm’s length arrangement.

When allowing unpaid present trust entitlements in favour of a SMSF, it is therefore necessary to ensure that interest on those unpaid distributions is paid by the trust at market rates as would be the case if the SMSF and trust were dealing with each other at arm’s length.

As usual, please make contact if you would like access to any of the content mentioned in this post.

** For the trainspotters, the title of today's post is riffed from the Fatboy Slim song 'right here, right now’.

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