Go your own way - The Rinehart Ruling – a key aspect **

Following last week’s post in relation to the, suspected, Tax Office Ruling in relation to the Rinehart trust dispute matter, there was some discussion about one key aspect of the reasoning.

In particular, the question of when a beneficiary becomes absolutely entitled to a particular capital asset as against the trustee is generally seen as critical.

The position appears to be that, where a trustee has a right of indemnity (and lien over) the relevant asset, it is not enough that the beneficiary has a ‘vested and indefeasible’ interest in the trust capital.

Instead, the beneficiary must have the right to force the trustee to transfer to them the asset, subject only to the payment of the trustee's expenses.

In order for this to be the case the better view appears to be that one of the following tests must be met, despite some suggestions to the contrary in the Tax Office’s Taxation Ruling 2004/D25 (TR 2004/D25), mentioned in last week’s post –

1. If the trust is over particular assets, then the trustee has a clear duty to transfer those assets to the beneficiary, without the trustee having any express or implied power of sale under the trust instrument.
2. Alternatively, if the trustee has a power of sale, the beneficiary must have demanded a particular asset be transferred to them and must tender sufficient funds to the trustee to satisfy the trustee’s right of indemnity.
3. Finally, absolute entitlement may be created by a trustee resolving to exercise a power under the trust deed (or at law) that a particular asset be immediately distributed to the beneficiary.

Importantly, and as flagged by the Tax Office in TR 2004/D25, a trustee’s right of indemnity of itself is irrelevant to the question of whether absolute entitlement exists. Rather it is a trustee's power of sale that will generally prevent a beneficiary being able to demonstrate absolute entitlement. However this point is unfortunately not clear in TR 2004/D25, despite the Ruling running to over 100 pages.

As usual, please make contact if you would like access to any of the content mentioned in this post.

** For the trainspotters, ‘Go Your Own way’ is another song by legendary band Fleetwood Mac from 1977.

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(I will follow**) the leading case about fettering of a trustee’s discretion

Previous View posts have considered the issues of a trustee fettering its discretion in the context of an insurance funded buy sell arrangement.

The principle in relation to the probation on a trustee fettering its discretion is arguably best captured in the decision of Fitzwood Pty Ltd v Unique Goal Pty Ltd (in liquidation) [2001] FCA 1628.

In this case the key concepts concerning fettering were summarised as follows –

‘… a trustee is not entitled to fetter the exercise of a discretionary power (for example a power to sale) in advance: Thacker v Key (1869) LR 8 Eq 408; In re Vestey’s Settlement [1951] Ch D 209.

If the trustee makes a resolution to that effect, it will be unenforceable, and if the trustee enters into an agreement to that effect, the agreement will not be enforced (Moore v Clench (1875) 1 Ch D 447), though the trustee may be liable in damages for breach of contract …’

Thus in the case mentioned above of In re Vestey’s Settlement, a binding decision to indefinitely make set annual distributions to a particular beneficiary was held to generally be seen as invalid due to the rule against fettering.

The decision in Lambert and Commissioner of Taxation [2013] AATA 442, another case featured in other View posts, further reinforces the above points.

In this case the court confirmed that a trustee is under a fiduciary duty to exercise its powers and discretions upon real and genuine consideration in accordance with the purposes for which the discretion was conferred.

In particular, as confirmed in Karger v Paul [1984] VR 161, it as an inherent requirement of the exercise of any discretion that it be given real and genuine consideration, or as set out in Partridge v The Equity Trustees Executors and Agency Company Limited [1947] HCA 42, there must be the 'exercise of an active discretion'.

Other examples in this regard include:

1. the granting of a call option under a lease for the lessee to buy the property was an invalid fetter on the ability for the trustee to sell the property (see: Re Stephenson's Settled Estates (1906) 6 SR (NSW) 420). This outcome should be contrasted to the conclusion in last week's post, where the trust deed expressly allows a trustee to grant options.
2. an attempt by a willmaker to mandate via a letter of wishes about how distributions from a testamentary trust set up under the will should made, was an invalid fetter on the trustee's wide discretionary powers for the trustee under the will (see: Burns v Burns & Anor [2008] QSC 173). Specifically it was confirmed that trustees (and third parties) cannot fetter the future exercise of the trustee’s powers. Any fetter is of no effect. Trustees need to be properly informed of all relevant matters at the time they come to exercise their relevant power.
3. as an example in contrast, it has been held that more general statements about the preferred manner of a trustee exercising its discretion - that do not in fact create a binding obligation on the trustee - are not an invalid fetter. Simply because a trustee consistently, and every year for many years in a row, follows an identical approach in determining how to exercise its discretion, this will not automatically mean the trustee has forgone having any real choice (see: Entrust Pension Ltd v Prospect Hospice Ltd [2013] PLR 73, [37]).

Next week's post will consider one of the leading cases where an arrangement that would have been under the above principles amounted to a breach of the rule against fettering of a trustee’s discretion was in fact enforced.

As usual, please make contact if you would like access to any of the content mentioned in this post.

** For the trainspotters, the title of today's post is riffed from the U2 song 'I will follow’.

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Seven dwarves, pizzas for the homeless and pre-chopped broccoli florets** – taking the detail to a whole new level

Following last week’s post, where I mentioned that, particularly in New South Wales, it is often the case that trustees are expressly prohibited from being beneficiaries of discretionary trusts there were a number of questions relayed to me. Thank you also for the suggestions as to what hair product Van Halen would have likely demanded at the height of their fame in the mid 1980s.

The key reason the ‘trustee can’t be a beneficiary’ prohibition is so prevalent in New South Wales is that under the stamp duty laws there, in order for a trustee to be permitted to be appointed (particularly where there is a change of trustee of a pre-existing trust), that trustee must not be a potential beneficiary of the trust.

Obviously, there are a range of asset protection related issues in this regard as well. At the centre of these issues is the fact that a trustee is directly liable for misadventures of the trust. As a general rule, the maximum value of a trustee company from time to time should never be more than a nominal amount – ie $2. A trustee company receiving distributions as a corporate beneficiary will breach this rule immediately.

Importantly however, many trust deed providers that offer deeds nationally, will incorporate the prohibition on a trustee being a potential beneficiary, even for trusts that do not otherwise have any connection with New South Wales.

This prohibition will often be weaved into a trust instrument in a less than obvious manner. Unless there is a pedantic approach to reviewing the terms of a trust deed the prohibition will be missed.

In summary – yet another example of the importance of the mantra ‘read the deed’.

As usual, if you would like access to any of the content mentioned in this post please contact me.

** for the trainspotters, the singer of the theme song of ‘Trainspotting’, being ‘Lust for Life’ Iggy Pop allegedly had a contract rider requiring seven dwarves, pizzas to give to the homeless, and pre-chopped broccoli florets (to make them easier to throw away).

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Rooms for the memory** - she said v he said evidence in court proceedings

Last week's post explored the case of Callus v KB Investments - [2020] VCC 135.

The decision also provides a useful summary of the approach a court must take when considering the evidence from opposing litigants.

In summary it was stated:

1. Human memory of what was said in a conversation is fallible for a variety of reasons, and ordinarily the degree of fallibility increases with the passage of time, particularly where disputes or litigation intervene, and the process of memory are overlaid, often subconsciously, by perceptions or self-interest as well as conscious consideration of what should have been said or could have been said. All too often what is actually remembered is little more than an impression from which plausible details are then, again often subconsciously, constructed. All this is a matter of ordinary human experience (see: Watson v Foxman (1995) 49 NSWLR 315 at 319).
2. The best approach for a judge to adopt in the trial of a commercial case is to place little if any reliance on witnesses’ recollection of what was said in meetings and conversations, and to base factual findings on inferences drawn from the documentary evidence and known or probable facts (see: Blue v Ashley (No 2) [2017] EWHC 1928).
3. Where there is conflicting evidence, the court will place ‘primary emphasis on the objective factual surrounding material and the inherent commercial probabilities’ together with documentation tendered in evidence' (see: Bullhead Pty Ltd v Brickmakers Place & Ors [2017] VSC 206).

As usual, please contact me if you would like access to any of the content mentioned in this post.

** For the trainspotters, the title of today's post is riffed from the Michael Hutchence/Ollie Olsen song 'Rooms for the Memory’.

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Do beneficiaries need to believe in love** when concerned about trustee distributions?

Many previous posts have considered the overriding duty of trustees of trusts - and the fact that a trustee must exercise its discretion in good faith, upon real and genuine consideration and for a proper purpose.

Again with 30 June rapidly approaching, the decision in Callus v KB Investments - [2020] VCC 135 provides a useful example of the approach the courts will take in this area.

Relevantly the factual matrix involved:

1. A family trust set up by the parents of the family (on apparently standard terms);
2. Over time, all adult children benefited in various ways from the assets of the trust;
3. Some years after the trust was established, a new trustee company was appointed, with one of the adult sons the sole director of the company;
4. Around 3 years later the trust distributed one of the properties of the trust to the sole director in his personal name;
5. On discovering the transfer some years later, a sister brought proceedings to unwind the transaction and have the trustee replaced.

In letting the transfer stand, however also removing the trustee, the court confirmed:

1. While the trustee did not give any reasons for its decision to transfer the asset, it was not required to under the trust deed.
2. In any event, no record was provided of the decision – and even if there had been a document disclosing the reasons produced, the trust deed provided that the trustee was not bound to disclose any document setting out any reasons for any particular exercise of the trustee’s power.
3. The trustee was entitled to transfer the property to the son under the terms of the trust deed, which provided that the trustee may in its absolute discretion transfer any property ‘to any beneficiary for his own use and benefit in such manner as it shall think fit’ - with specific provision also confirming the trustee did not have any obligation ‘to consider competing claims of beneficiaries’.
4. The trustee also had no obligation to tell other potential beneficiaries of the trust of the transfer.
5. In contrast, due to the clear hostility between the son and one of his sisters (their relationship had deteriorated significantly following the transfer) the court was of the view that the trustee should be replaced, applying the rules explored in many previous posts centred on the test that 'the only guide is the welfare of the beneficiaries, and a trustee may be removed if the court is satisfied that its continuance in office would be detrimental to their interests'.

As usual, please contact me if you would like access to any of the content mentioned in this post.

** For the trainspotters, the title of today's post is riffed from the Human League song 'Love Action (I believe in love)'.

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The Mirror (man)** test - trustee powers of investment

Previous posts have considered various aspects of a trustee's powers.

Given another 30 June is on the horizon, it is timely to remember that the scope of a trustee's powers is often limited when relying on the provisions of the state based legislation in the area - reinforcing the preference to have comprehensive powers set out under the trust deed wherever possible.

The decision in G v G (No. 2) - [2020] NSWSC 818 is a useful point of reference in this regard.

The case involved the powers of a trustee of a protected estate (where the underlying sole beneficiary had lost capacity to manage their own affairs). As there was no trust deed regulating the trust, the relevant trusts act applied.

The key question in contention was whether the trustee had the power to invest assets of the trust in a retail superannuation fund (as opposed to a self managed superannuation fund).

The reason for the proceedings being the view that a payment by a trustee (which it was argued that by analogy, included a protected estate manager) into a superannuation fund is not an 'investment' of trust property by the trustee.

This was said to be because, by the payment into the fund, the trustee divests itself of trust property, loses control of that property and puts the property beyond the protective control of the court, albeit that, as a member of the fund, but without a property interest in the fund, the beneficiary (not the trustee) obtains a right to future benefits.

Furthermore, the trustee had arranged a binding death benefit nomination in favour of the legal personal representative of the estate of the beneficiary.

The court confirmed:

1. The trustee had the power under the relevant legislation to invest, or to authorise a private manager to invest, a protected estate into membership of a Regulated Superannuation Fund (although perhaps not a self managed superannuation fund, without deciding that issue).
2. This was at least in part because a protected estate manager stands in the shoes of the protected person and is the substitute decision maker. A protected estate manager does not hold property for the benefit of the protected person. Rather the protected estate manager controls the property which always remains in the name of the protected person.
3. There was however no power under the legislation for the making of a binding, or indeed any other form of nomination, for the payment of a death benefit payable by the trustee of a superannuation fund.
4. This was despite the fact that the court acknowledged that the prevailing view in Australia is that a binding death benefit nomination is not a testamentary act either because it is merely the exercise of a contractual right or the rules of the fund pursuant to which the nomination is given to the trustee confer a discretion on the trustee as to the identity of the person, or persons, to whom the benefit is to be paid.
5. Rather it was held that the management of an estate terminates on the death of the protected person and therefore the manager's power to make a decision about what happens to the protected person's funds after their death cannot be valid.
6. Thus, here, the proper course of action in relation to the nomination was there to be a separate court application authorising the effective making of a gift out of the estate of a protected person, and (perhaps) also an application for a statutory will (another topic considered regularly in View posts).

As usual, please contact me if you would like access to any of the content mentioned in this post.

** For the trainspotters, the title of today's post is riffed from the Human League song 'Mirror Man'.

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