Anything goes?** - Partnerships of trusts using a common trustee

Last week’s post considered the issues surrounding whether a partnership exists.

One issue that is raised relatively regularly in this context is whether a partnership of discretionary trusts, each with the same corporate trustee, can be a ‘partnership’ in the context of the various Partnership Acts in each state.

While it is a common commercial approach for a single corporation to act as trustee for multiple trusts, there is at times debate about whether a single trustee can act for multiple trusts who are seeking to trade in partnership.

Each state has different legislation in this regard, however the definition of a ‘partnership’ is substantially similar, generally being defined as a ‘relation which subsists between persons carrying on a business in common with a view of profit’.

‘Person’ is defined in the Acts Interpretation Act of each state as an individual or a corporation. Arguably therefore, one corporate trustee of multiple trusts seeking to form a partnership with themselves is not a partnership under the Partnership Acts because it is not a relationship which subsists between persons (with emphasis on the use of the plural word ‘persons’).

Against this argument is the fact that the Acts Interpretation Act in each state confirms both that plural words are deemed to have singular application and that an interpretation that best achieves the purpose of an act is to be preferred to any other interpretation.

On this basis a corporate trustee forming partnership with itself (in multiple capacities) will be a valid partnership under the Partnership Acts.

Furthermore, at least from a tax perspective, the Tax Office treats a single corporate trustee of multiple trusts purporting to be in partnership as a tax law partnership.

In particular in PSLA 2011/8, the Tax Office confirms that an entity or person can act in multiple capacities and in these instances they are taken to be a different entity or person, particularly where a trustee is a company.

As usual, please make contact if you would like access to any of the content mentioned in this post.

** For the trainspotters, the title of today's post is riffed from the Death in Vegas song ‘Aisha’.

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When one is no more fun – another tip on changing trustees **

As highlighted in previous posts, there are a myriad of issues that should be taken into account in relation to any decision to change the trustee of a trust (see for example our post on 7 February 2017).

One critical issue under the Trusts Acts in most states is the rule that where there are two or more individual trustees appointed initially of a trust, the retiring trustees will continue to be liable unless replaced by:

1. at least two individual trustees; or
2. a ‘trustee corporation’.

For the purposes of these rules the ‘trustee corporation’ must be a formal trustee company, as opposed to a private propriety company.

Importantly, the trust instrument may override these rules and allow trustees to be discharged, even when replaced by a single trustee.

Often however trustees will be changed without the required permission in the trust instrument, completely ignorant of the Trust Acts rules, meaning the retiring trustees unknowingly continue to be liable.

For obvious reasons we therefore generally recommend an amendment to any trust deed that does not expressly override the Trusts Acts requirement, however this is approach is also subject to the standard mantra ‘read the deed’ as often deeds will not in fact permit this type of variation.

In situations where a variation is not permitted, one work around that helps in some (but unfortunately not all) states is to appoint (say) one individual trustee and a propriety company of which the individual trustee is the sole shareholder and director.

As usual, please make contact if you would like access to any of the content mentioned in this post.

** For trainspotters, ‘More Fun’ is song by legendary Australian band Radio Birdman.

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Get Up** to speed: companies acting as trustees of wills

One issue that comes up regularly is whether a company can act as an executor and trustee of a will.

While there are a number of issues that need to be taken into account, broadly the position is as follows:

1. Individuals must apply for probate of a will, unless an exempted entity (eg the Public Trustee, Perpetual, ANZ Trustees or NAB Trustees etc) is appointed;
2. There are no such prohibitions at law in relation to who may act as trustee of a testamentary trust;
3. We regularly assist in setting up estate plans with a private company acting as the trustee of a testamentary trust; and
4. There are a range of issues that best practice suggests should be taken into account however – we often for example see the failure to take into account the rules under the Corporations Act prohibiting share self ownership, addressed in two previous posts.

As usual, please contact me if you would like access to any of the content mentioned in this post.

** For the trainspotters, the title of today's post is riffed from the REM song ‘Get up’.

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The (heavy) duty** to account

A reminder came to me recently about the duty of trustees ‘to account’.

Relevantly the High Court in Byrnes v Kendle [2011] HCA 26 highlighted that the term 'duty to account', encompasses several important obligations:

1. A duty to keep records;
2. A duty to report to the beneficiaries or the court concerning the administration of the trust; and
3. The duty to pay amounts, the trustee is obliged to pay to the beneficiaries.

The trustee's duty to account is a fundamental fiduciary obligation imposed upon a trustee.

In discharging that duty, the trustee is required to keep proper accounts of the trust.

Importantly however, in relation to the right of a beneficiary to request information from a trustee, there is likely to be a divergence in terms of the level of detail a trustee of a discretionary trust is required to provide a beneficiary, as opposed to the trustee of a unit or fixed trust.

In particular, in relation to discretionary trusts, where each beneficiary only has a mere expectancy (that is, as explained in other View posts, the right to be considered), the duty to account imposed on a trustee is likely to be less onerous than for fixed trusts.

This is because the trustee of a discretionary trust also has a duty to act in the best interests of all beneficiaries - which means disclosure of certain information on demand of some beneficiaries may not in fact be appropriate, if the trustee on reasonable grounds so decides.

Practically, where there is contention around these issues it may be the conclusion in Schmidt v Rosewood Trust Ltd (Isle of Man) [2003] 2 A.C 709 is most relevant. In this case it was relevantly held that a beneficiary's right to seek disclosure of trust documents and accounts, is best approached as one aspect of the court's inherent jurisdiction to supervise, and if necessary intervene in, the administration of trusts.

The nature of any court's intervention will depend on the court's discretion on a case by case basis.

In particular, the court will determine:

1. whether a discretionary object (or some other beneficiary with only a remote or wholly defeasible interest) should be granted relief at all;
2. what classes of documents should be disclosed, either completely or in a redacted form; and
3. what safeguards should be imposed (whether by undertakings to the court, arrangements for professional inspection, or otherwise) to limit the use which may be made of documents or information disclosed.

As usual, please contact me if you would like access to any of the content mentioned in this post.

** for the trainspotters, ‘Heavy Duty’ is a song from Spinal Tap. 

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A 101 tip on changing (everyday)** trustees

A regular theme in previous posts is how critical it is to ensure that the provisions of a trust instrument are followed precisely when taking steps in relation to the trust.

The SMSF related case of Moss Super Pty Ltd vs. Hayne [2008] VSC 158 is one example of this principle, in the context of a change of trusteeship.

In summary:

1. As is becoming increasingly common, there were issues around the rightful controller of the SMSF following the death of one of the members;
2. The surviving member purported to change the trusteeship of the SMSF, so that a company of which she was the sole shareholder and director would be appointed;
3. The trust deed set out the process by which a change of trusteeship could take place and specifically required the ‘founder’ to appoint any new trustee;
4. While the sole director of the new trustee company was also the founder, she did not in fact sign the change of trustee documentation in the capacity as founder;
5. In other words, while she signed as the sole director of the new trustee, there was no provision where she also signed under the founder role; and
6. Critically, the court found that, as was the case here, legal structures are created where individuals had multiple roles to play, the requirements around those roles must be respected and complied with.

In many respects, the decision reflects a number of analogous situations in the context of family trusts including the case of re Cavill that has been featured previously.

As usual, please contact me if you would like access to any of the content mentioned in this post.

** for the trainspotters, the title today is riffed from the Culture Club song ‘Changing every day’.

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(Nothing) challenging** a trustee's decision

Previous posts have considered the key aspects of the Ioppolo decision.

One aspect of the decision, which is potentially very relevant for advisers and clients alike, relates to the plaintiff's argument that the trustee (being effectively the surviving husband) had not exercised his discretion in paying the entirety of his deceased wife's death benefit to himself in a 'bona fide' (or in good faith) manner, and therefore, should have been forced to repay the benefit to the fund.

In addressing this issue, the court specifically commented as follows:

1. The husband had sought specialist advice in relation to his rights and obligations as the trustee;
2. The husband deliberately waived his right to confidentiality (or privilege) in relation to this advice;
3. The court on reviewing the advice agreed with the conclusion given, that being that the husband was able to make the payment to himself;
4. Where a trustee is acting on advice of a specialist, it will be generally very difficult to successfully argue that the trustee lacked good faith in making a decision;
5. Even whereas here, there was a provision of the deceased’s will that contradicted the decision ultimately made by the husband, this of itself did not automatically mean that the husband was acting without good faith, particularly when there was no other evidence to support the allegation; and
6. Ultimately, a court will only review the way in which the discretion of a trustee is exercised in very limited circumstances.

Next week’s post will provide commentary on the outcome of an appeal of the original decision.

As usual, please contact me if you would like access to any of the content mentioned in this post.

** for the trainspotters, the title today is riffed from the James song ‘Ring the bells’.

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(Quick) Succession** with super fund trusteeship on death

Recent posts have considered the various issues that can arise in relation to the payment of superannuation entitlements following death.

The case of Ioppolo & Hesford v Conti & Anor [2013] WASC 389 provides another example of how unintended consequences can arise where the control of a self managed superannuation fund (SMSF) is not carefully considered as part of a comprehensive estate plan.

The background of the case was as follows:

1) the husband and wife originally established an SMSF and were the individual trustees;

2) following the wife’s death, the husband appointed a corporate trustee (not the legal personal representative of his wife’s estate) of which he was the sole director and shareholder in order to comply with the relevant superannuation legislation;

3) the corporate trustee (with the husband as sole director), then resolved to pay the entirety of the wife’s superannuation entitlements to the husband, as opposed to her legal personal representative pursuant to her will;

4) the executors of the will sought to unwind the distribution, partly because of a direction in the will that related to the superannuation entitlements;

5) in particular, the executors argued that the husband failed to act in a bona fide manner because of the provision in the will.
In dismissing the executor’s claim and allowing the husband to retain all of the wife’s superannuation entitlements, the court confirmed that there is no obligation under the superannuation legislation for a surviving trustee to automatically appoint the executors of a former co-trustee as replacement trustees of an SMSF.

In many ways, the decision simply reinforces the principle from the Katz v Grossman case some years earlier.

As usual, please contact me if you would like access to any of the content mentioned in this post.

** for the trainspotters, the title today is riffed from the Elliott Smith song ‘Bled White’. View hear (sic): 

What you need** with super death benefit planning

Last week’s post considered the case of Katz v Grossman.

Earlier posts have considered the various types of superannuation death benefit nominations that can be made.

Clearly if the father in Katz v Grossman had utilised a binding death benefit nomination, then there would likely have not been any successful challenge to the ultimate payment of the superannuation entitlements

Some of the other planning strategies that can be utilised to regulate how superannuation benefits are distributed on death include:

1) incorporating automatic adjustment clauses under the terms of a will, to take into account benefits that are received directly from a superannuation fund;

2) mandating the succession of trusteeship of the superannuation fund; and

3) entrenching approval mechanisms for death benefit payments, for example, by prohibiting a payment until trustee receives consent from a trusted third party.

As usual, please contact me if you would like access to any of the content mentioned in this post.

** for the trainspotters, the title today is riffed from the INXS song ‘What you need’. View hear (sic):

  

The Original (Sin)** and super death benefits - the Katz decision

Superannuation entitlements are regularly one of the most significant assets in any estate planning exercise.

Critically however, superannuation benefits need to be regulated in a way that complements a wider estate planning exercise. Arguably, one of the leading cases in relation to superannuation death benefit planning remains, after more than 15 years, the decision in Katz v Grossman [2005] NSWSC 934.

The case involved Katz bringing an action against his sister Grossman (and her husband), claiming an interest in their father’s self managed superannuation fund (SMSF).

A summary of the facts is as follows:

1. originally, the father and mother were the individual trustees of the SMSF;
2. the mother died some years before the father, and subsequently Grossman was appointed as a co-trustee with the father (this was to ensure that the SMSF continued to comply with the relevant superannuation legislation);
3. when the father later died, Grossman appointed her husband as a co-trustee with her;
4. during his lifetime the father had made a non-binding nomination indicating that he wanted his superannuation entitlements divided equally between Katz and Grossman; and
5. Grossman and her husband ignored the nomination and paid the entirety of the superannuation entitlements for the benefit to herself.

The Court held that all the trustees of the SMSF had been validly appointed at the relevant times, and that as a result, the challenge by Katz was unsuccessful and Grossman was entitled to keep the superannuation entitlements.

As usual, please contact me if you would like access to any of the content mentioned in this post.

** for the trainspotters, the title today is riffed from the INXS song ‘Original Sin’. View hear (sic):

People are strange** … When SMSF trustees disagree

Today’s post considers the situation of where the trustees of a Self Managed Superannuation Fund (SMSF) cannot agree. 

This situation arose perhaps most starkly in the New South Wales Supreme Court decision of Notaras v Notaras [2012] NSWSC 947. 

In this case, two brothers were the trustees and members of an SMSF. Over time, one of the brothers (Brinos) made withdrawals from the SMSF, of which around $60,000 were alleged to be in excess of his entitlement. 

Brinos’ brother (Basil) had no knowledge of the withdrawals and thus had not provided consent. 

Basil approached the court to seek an order that Brinos be removed as trustee of the SMSF due to his failure to act jointly and replaced with a corporate trustee (Bazport) of which Basil was the sole director and shareholder. 

The court accepted Basil’s arguments and appointed Bazport as the co-trustee in the place of Brinos leaving the SMSF with both an individual and corporate trustee. 

The Court confirmed Basil would (as a result of the decision) need approval from the Tax Office for its failure to comply with the superannuation law requirement of all members of an SMSF also being trustees. 

As usual, please contact me if you would like access to any of the content mentioned in this post. 

** for the trainspotters, ‘People are strange’ is a song by The Doors. View hear (sic):